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I. Overview 
1. Introduction 
In this number : 
Report on the implementation 
of macro-financial 
assistance to third countries in 1995 
Initially conceived for intra-Community balance-of-payments support, macro-finan-
cial assistance from the Community has been extended since 1990 to third countries, 
mainly those of Central and Eastern Europe, but, progressively, also to other countries, 
in the former Soviet Union and in the Mediterranean area, with a view to supporting their 
political and economic reform efforts. As they embarked on their process of transition to 
a market economy, the countries of this region were faced with similar problems: sub-
stantial costs attached to the first steps of reform, additional external shocks (the Gulf 
War embargo, the collapse of the COMECON);insufficient resources available from the 
International Financial Institutions (IFis) and virtually non-existent flows from the pri-
vate sector. 
Against this background, the European Community decided to extend macro-financial 
assistance to the countries in the region in complement to the financing provided by the 
IFis. It was also decided that, in the context of the assistance co-ordination process 
agreed among the 24 industrial countries (G-24) to help the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries (CEECs), the Commission should get other donors to contribute in a simi-
lar way to support the economic programmes that these countries were implementing in 
agreement with the IMF and World Bank. 
A number of such support operations by the EU and the G-24 took place in 1990-1994 
covering most Central and Eastern European countries eligible to G-24 assistance 
(Tables 1 and 2). 
Outside the region of Central and Eastern Europe, several other Community loan oper-
ations were decided by the Council during this period. In the context of Community sup-
port for Mediterranean countries adversely affected by the Gulf conflict, the Council 
made available to Israel an ECU 160 million soft loan in July 1991. In September 1991, 
a medium-term loan of ECU 400 million was also decided in favour of Algeria to help 
the country carry through the political and economic reforms under way 1 • A further loan 
to Algeria for an amount of up to ECU 200 million was decided in late 19942• 
I See: Report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries, COM(94)229 of 7 June 1.994. 
2 See: Report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries, COM(95)572 of 27 November 1995. 
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Operations in favour of European Newly Independent 
States (NIS) have also been decided in 1994 comprising 
loans of up to ECU 45 million for Moldova and of up to 
ECU 85 million for Ukraine. 
At the initiative of the European Commission, a set of 
principles was agreed among the G-24 to serve as 
guidelines for the implementation of EU/G-24 
macro-financial assistance. These principles which 
underline the exceptional character of this assistance, its 
complementarity to financing from the IFis and its 
macro-economic conditionality, have been 
subsequently endorsed by the EU Council of Ministers 
of Finance (ECOFIN) and are now applying to the 
Community's macro-financial assistance to third 
countries. 
2. Macro-financial assistance in 1995 
In 1995, focus in the Community's macro-financial 
assistance shifted away from the Central and Eastern 
European group which, as a result of a generally positive 
economic performance, is relying less and less on 
external financial support from official sources. Instead, 
an increasing part of Community loans were directed 
towards the NIS and the Mediterranean region. 
Within the Central and Eastern European group, a first 
tranche of ECU 15 million of a grant to Albania totalling 
ECU 35 million, decided in December 1994, was 
actually disbursed in May 1995. The second tranche has, 
however, been delayed due to slippages in policy 
implementation in Albania. For similar reasons, 
disbursements pertaining to a ECU 125 million 
macro-financial loan to Romania decided in 1994 were 
delayed and the actual disbursement of the first tranche 
of ECU 55 million took place only in November 1995. 
In the case of Bulgaria, serious disturbances in the 
economy have considerably delayed the resumption of 
external assistance from the international financial 
institutions, the European Union and bilateral donors. A 
second tranche of ECU 40 million which is part of a 
Community loan of ECU 110 million to Bulgaria and 
which was initially decided in 1992 and reactivated in 
1994 is expected to be disbursed in 1996. In the case of 
Slovakia, no disbursements were made during 1995 
under the ECU 130 million loan facility decided in late 
1994. To the contrary, in the absence of sufficient 
progress between the Commission and the Slovak 
authorities in agreeing on the economic policy 
conditions to be attached to this facility and on account 
of the improving economic conditions in the country, the 
Commission has proposed to repeal the Council decision 
from 1994 to grant further macro-financial assistance to 
Slovakia. As regards all three Baltic states for which the 
Council had approved in 1992 macro-financial 
assistance, second tranches pertaining to the loans in 
favour of Latvia and Estonia have not been disbursed, on 
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TABLE I Community macro-financial assistance to third countries extended through end 1995 
(Status of effective disbursements as of April 1996 (i n millions of ECU)) 
Country Maximum Date of Council Disbursed Amounts and U ndisbursed 
amount authorized Decision Dates of disbursements 
A. Macr0-financial assistance to CEECs 
Hungary I 870 22.02.90 610 350 - Apr. 1990 260 
(Structural adjustment loan) 260-Feb. 1991 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 375 '.:5.u2.91 375 185 -Mar. 1991 
(Balance of payments loan) 190 -Mar. 1992 
Hungary II 180 24.06.91 180 100 -Aug. 1991 
(Balance of payments loan) 80- Jan. 1993 
Bulgaria I 150-Aug. 1991 
(Balance of payments loan) 290 24.06.91 290 140-Mar. 1992 
Romania I 375 22.07.91 375 190-Jan. 1992 
(Balance of payments loan) 185-Apr. 1992 
Albania I 70 28.09.92 70 35 - Dec. 1992 
(Balance of payments grant) 35 - Aug. 1993 
Baltics 220 23.11.92 135 85 
(Balance of payments loans) 
of which: 
Estonia 40 20 Mar. 1993 20 
Latvia 80 40 Mar. 1993 40 
Lithuania 100 75 50-Jul. 1993 25 
25-Aug. 1995 
Romania II 80 27.11.92 80 Feb. 1993 
(Balance of payments loan) 
Bulgaria II 110 19.10.92 70 Dec. 1994 40 
(BaJance of payments loan) 
Romania Ill 125 20.06.94 55 Nov. 1995 70 
(Balance of payments loan) 
Albania II 35 28.11.94 15 Jun. 1995 20 
(Balance of payments grant) 
Slovakia 130 22.J 2.94 130 
(Balance of payments loan) 
TOTAL A 2860 2255 605 
B. Macro-financial assistance to other third countries 
--- ---
Israel (IJ 187.5 22.07.91 187.5 Mar. 1992 
(Structural adjustment soft loan) 
Algeria I 400 23.09.91 400 250 - Jan. 1992 
(Balance of payments loan) 150 -Aug. 1994 
Moldova 45 13.06.94 45 25- Dec 1994 
(Balance of payments loan) 20 - Aug. 1995 
Algeria II 200 22.12.94 JOO Nov. 1995 JOO 
(Balance of payments loan) 
Ukraine I 85 22.12.94 85 Dec 1995 
(Balance of payments loan) 
Belarus 55 10.04.95 30 Dec 1995 25 
(Balance of payments loan) 
Ukraine II 200 23.10.95 200 
(Balance of payments loan) 
TOTAL B 1172.5 847.5 325 
TOTAL A+B 4032.5 3102.5 930 
( I) Assistance to Israel includes a loan principal amount of ECU 160 million and grants of ECU 27.5 million in the form of interest rates subsidies. 
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account mainly of the good record of the countries' 
balance of payments. In August 1995 the Commission 
disbursed an ECU 25 million instalment on the second 
tranche of the Community loan in favour of Lithuania, 
on account of the country's good record of progress of 
reforms. 
Among the NIS (former Soviet Union), the 
Commission was, for Moldova, in a position to release 
the second tranche of ECU 20 million pertaining to a 
ECU 45 million loan from 1994 in August 1995, 
following fulfilment on the part of Moldova of the 
agreed conditions for the release of this tranche. With 
a view to ensuring a sustainable balance-of-payments 
situation for Moldova also during the 1995-1996 
period the international donor community recognised, 
in early 199 5, the need to provide further 
macro-financial assistance to this country. The 
Council consequently decided, in early 1996, to 
provide Moldova with a further loan of up to ECU 15 
million. Belarus, which has been relatively late in 
embarking on economic reform, agreed a stand-by 
arrangement with the IMF in 1995. In the 
circumstances, the Council, after assessing the 
economic and financial situation of the country, 
decided in April 1995 to assist Belarus with a 
macro-financial loan of up to ECU 75 million. The 
Commission eventually in October set the amount of 
the loan atECU 55 million on the basis of the country's 
revised financing needs. A first tranche of this loan 
(ECU 30 million) was disbursed in December 1995. 
Regarding Ukraine, finally, the Commission was, after 
significant delays on the part of the Ukrainian 
authorities, in a position to disburse a macro-financial 
loan of ECU 85 million in December of 1995. In the 
light of the continued economic difficulties of the 
country and renewed efforts by the Ukrainian 
government to address these difficulties, the Council 
decided in October 1995 to provide further 
macro-financial assistance to Ukraine up to an amount 
of ECU 200 million. The first disbursements under this 
loan facility are expected for the second half of 1996. 
In the Mediterranean region, finally, a second 
macro-financial loan to Algeria, of the amount of ECU 
200 million, was decided by the Council in December 
1994 and the first tranche - of ECU 100 million - was 
disbursed in November 1995. 
Each Community operation has continued to respond 
to the set of principles applying to this type of 
assistance. In particular, Community macro-financial 
assistance has supported efforts by recipient countries 
to bring about economic reforms and structural 
changes. In close co-ordination with the IMF and the 
World Bank, it has promoted policies tailored to the 
specific national needs, designed to stabilize the 
financial situation and set up market-oriented 
economies, (macroeconomic performance and 
progress in reforms in beneficiary countries are 
summarized in Tables 4 and 5 and discussed country by 
country in the following chapters). 
3. Trends and tendencies in macro-financial 
assistance 
As indicated earlier, developments in 1995 further 
reinforced a trend that could be seen already in 1994 
with respect to the geographical focus of the 
Community's macro-financial assistance. 
Simultaneously, the increasing diversity in economic 
conditions among beneficiaries led to increasingly 
diverse demands, which - in turn - have made the 
macro-financial instrument, as such, evolve further. A 
relevant question for the future is to what extent the 
existing instrument(s) can be adapted further to suit the 
goals of the Union while at the same time meeting the 
evolving needs of beneficiary countries. 
In the case of the Central and East European countries, 
macro-financial support has formed part of a broad 
effort by the Union to establish closer links with them. 
Association Agreements have been signed with 
practically all these countries. In accepting, in 
Copenhagen in June 1993, the goal of Union 
membership for them, the European Council put 
forward political and economic measures to promote 
this end, among which macro-financial assistance was 
explicitly mentioned as one avenue. Since then, the 
process of preparing the associated states of Central 
and Eastern Europe for membership has intensified. 
During this process, the links between 
macro-economic stabilisation and structural 
adjustment have become increasingly clearer. For the 
IMF, it translated into a better integration of such 
aspects into programmes negotiated with these 
countries while the World Bank supported national 
authorities to design specific programmes focusing on 
key structural reforms to be supported by policy-based 
lending. 
For the Union as well, both timing and content of 
programmes have been affected. Community lending 
has become more policy-oriented while at the same 
time achieving greater synergy with grant-based 
instruments (mostly PHARE). 
The countries in Central and Eastern Europe are in 
different stages of economic transformation and some 
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of them have clearly moved to a stage in their economic 
reform process where balance of payments assistance 
may no longer be needed. The Community 
macro-financial assistance in its original form, to 
support macro-economic stabilisation and the balance 
of payments, is still fully relevant for assisting some of 
them. In several other countries macro-financial 
assistance is now more centred on supporting the 
government's structural reform programme in 
combination with PHARE, which whenever possible 
can contribute to strengthening the capacity of relevant 
national institutions to underpin such reforms. In 
general, these developments have also led to increased 
co-operation between the Commission and the Bretton 
Woods institutions. At the same time, the dialogue with 
the authorities in the countries concerned has 
broadened considerably. 
While overall amounts of resources committed have 
fallen, the Community macro-financial assistance has 
thus tended to become geographically more targeted on 
associate countries further to the east and south in 
Europe. 
The trend towards supporting neighbouring countries 
further away from the immediate borders of the Union 
is reinforced if we also consider the three European 
New Independent States that have received 
macro-financial support from the Community -
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Here too, focus has 
gradually shifted towards more emphasis on structural 
reform . As in CEECs, grant-based instruments 
(mainly TACIS) have been relied upon in parallel to 
support the countries concerned. 
The specific examples of Ukraine and Belarus, 
together with Bulgaria and Romania among the 
CEECs, also serve to illustrate another trend, namely 
that countries that have either embarked late on 
economic reform, like Belarus, or have moved slowly, 
like Romania, or have lost time while hesitating or even 
partly reversing reforms, like Ukraine or Bulgaria, all 
find themselves in relatively difficult positions. In this 
respect, the macro-financial assistance provided by 
the Community seems to have well served its cause by 
reinforcing the transition efforts in those countries who 
choose to embark on ambitious reform programmes. 
4. Burden-sharing 
While Community macro-financial assistance has 
been evolving towards a deepened policy-oriented 
approach, resources mobilized by the Union in this 
context have been decreasing substantially (Tables 3 
and 3.1). Initially, an important feature of Community 
assistance was that very large sums of money were to 
be found to support Bretton Woods institutions 
programmes. The Community played a key role both 
as the largest single provider of these funds, 
(mobilizing 54% of total balance of payments support 
to Hungary in 1990) and through its role as the 
co-ordinator of bilateral assistance (the G-24 process 
for CEECs since 1991 ), which ensured a wide 
participation in this effort. 
Eventually, more resources were mobilized by the IFis 
(whose contribution increased from 21 % of balance of 
payments support - excluding debt relief - in 1991 to 
some 80 percent in 1995): a new lending instrument, 
the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) was 
created which, together with the increase in the access 
limits, enabled the IMP to increase its assistance to 
CEECs and countries of the former Soviet Union. The 
World Bank, for its part , developed successive 
generations of policy-based balance of payments 
operations (Structural Adjustment loans -SAL-, 
followed by Enterprise and Financial Sectors 
Adjustment loans -EFSAL3) . 
In parallel, contributions by external creditors, both 
public and private, were mobilized in the framework of 
debt-relief and debt-reduction operations (Algeria, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine), accounting for a substantial share 
of balance of payments support in 1991 and 1994. 
In this context, relative contributions4 from the 
European Union and from other bilaterals (beyond 
debt relief operations) declined sharply from 54% and 
25%, respectively in 1990 to 14% and 6%, 
respectively, in 1995 (or 6% and 3%, respectively, of 
total commitments including debt relief operations). 
3 Most EFSAL operations di scussed with benefic iary countries could not be 
concluded by end- 1995 and are therefore not included in the commitments 
recorded in Tables 3 and 3.1. When they are, contribution by the World 
Bank will increase accordingly. 
4 Only the countries for which macro-financial ass istance fro m the EU has 
been mobili zed are covered by these stati stics . 
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TABLE 2: EU/G-24 macro-financial assistance to Central and Eastern Europe since 1991 (cumulative amounts) 
(Status as of December 95) 
Country Albania Baltic States Bulgaria 
(ldenti fied gaps) (US $ 237 million) (US$ 600 million) (US $ 1130 million) 
Commitments Disburs. Commitments Disburs. Commitments Disburs. 
Million % of % of Million % of Million % of % of Million % of Million % of % of Million % of 
us $ gap commit. US$ disb. us$ gap commit. us $ di sb. USS gap commit. US$ disb. 
Community 123.5 52.l 71.0 JOO.I 88.7 300.0 50.0 57.4 184.0 54.0 533.3 47.2 58.9 487.7 70.4 
EFTA * 14.2 6.0 8.2 4.2 3.7 123.l 20.5 23.5 67.9 19.9 126.0 11.2 13.9 95.0 13.7 
United States 10.0 0.9 I.] 10.0 1.4 
Japan 36. 3 15.3 20.9 8.5 7.5 100.0 16.7 19.l 88.9 26.1 228.1 20.2 25.2 100.0 14.4 
Others 8.7 0.8 1.0 
Total 174.0 73.4 100.0 112.8 100.0 523.1 87.2 100.0 340.8 100.0 906.l 80.2 100.0 692.7 100.0 
* of which. A, S, SF 11.7 4.9 6.7 4.2 3.7 81 13.5 15.5 67.9 19.9 69.0 6.1 7.6 50.0 7.2 
Country CSFR Hungary ( 1 l Romania 
(Identified gaps) (US $ I OOO million) (US$ 500 million) (US$ 1455 million) 
Commitments Disburs. Commitments Disburs. Commitments Disburs. 
Million % of % of Million % of Million % of %of Million % of Million % of % of Million % of 
US $ gap commit. us$ disb. us$ gap commit. us $ di sb. US $ gap commit. US$ disb. 
Community 500.0 50.0 56.4 500.0 58.0 250.0 50.0 48.3 250.0 50.7 740.6 50.9 68.9 660.7 71.3 
EFTA * 146.0 14.6 16.5 146.0 16.9 95.0 19.0 18.3 95.0 19.3 162.2 II.I 15.1 143.3 15.5 
United States 15.0 1.5 1.7 15.0 l.7 10.0 2.0 l.9 10.0 2.0 
Japan 200.0 20.0 22.5 200.0 23.2 150.0 30.0 29.0 125.0 25.4 150.0 10.3 14.0 100.0 10.8 
Others 26.0 2.6 2.9 1.0 0.1 12.8 2.6 2.5 12.8 2.6 22.0 1.5 2.0 22.0 2.4 
Total 887.0 88.7 100.0 862.0 100.0 517.8 103.6 100.0 492.8 100.0 1074.8 73.9 100.0 926.0 100.0 
* of which. A, S, SF 90.0 9.0 10.1 90.0 10.4 50 10.0 9.7 50 JO. I 87. 3 6.0 8.1 78.4 8.5 
Country Slovakia Total 
(Identified gaps) (US $ 300 million) (US$ 5222 million) 
Commitments Disburs. Commitments Disburs. 
Million % of % of Million % of Million % of % of Million % of 
us $ gap commit. us$ disb. US $ gap commit. US $ disb. 
Community 156.0 52.0 64.1 2603.5 49.9 60.2 2182.5 62.6 
EFTA * 27.4 9.1 11.2 693.8 13.3 16.0 551.4 15.8 
United States 35.0 0.7 0.8 35.0 1.0 
Japan 60.0 20.0 24.7 60.0 100.0 924.4 17.7 21.4 682.4 19.6 
Others 69.5 l.3 1.6 35.8 1.0 
Total 243.4 81.l 100.0 60.0 100.0 4326.2 82.8 100.0 3487.1 100.0 
* of which. A, S, SF 16.4 5.5 6.7 405.3 7.8 9.4 340.5 9.8 
(I) In 1990. the Community committed in favour of Hungary an additional 870 MEC U loan which is not taken into consideratio n in this table since it took place outside the G-24 process. 
Source: European Commission. 
TABLE 3: Balance of payments support to recipients of EU macro-financial assistance by contributor, 1990-1995 (I) (in percent of total commitments) 
1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 
IFI's 21 50 69 27 33 IFl's 21 61 69 71 80 
IMF II 37 40 21 26 !MF 11 45 40 56 63 
World Bank 10 13 29 6 7 World Bank 10 16 29 15 17 
Bilaterals 79 50 31 73 67 Bilaterals 79 39 31 29 20 
EU(2l 54 20 19 6 6 EU (Z) 54 24 19 17 14 
Other bilateraJs(3) 25 13 13 5 3 Other bilaterals (3 ) 25 15 13 12 6 
of which: of which: 
USA 0 0 0 0 USA 0 0 0 2 0 
Japan 10 8 5 2 3 Japan 10 9 5 6 6 
Debt relief 0 18 0 63 59 ( 1) Based on Council Dec isions fo r EU operat ions. No operation was decided in 1993. 
Paris Club 5 32 0 (2) EU mac ro-financ ial assistance. 
London Club 28 0 (3) Including EU Member States. 
Other (4) 13 2 59 (4) Syndicated commercial banks loan in favour of Alge ria in 199 1. debt relief in favour of Ukraine 
by Russia and Turkme nistan in 1994 and in 1995. 
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TABLE 3.1: Balance of payments support to recipients of EU macr<rfinancial assistance by contributor, 1990-1995 
(in million of US $ and in percent of total commitments and disbursements) 
-----
Balance of payments support -1990 
Total Hungary I 
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % 
us$ us$ us$ US$ 
IFl's 419 21 375 23 419 21 375 23 
IMF 219 II 175 II 219 II 175 II 
World Bank (policy based) 200 10 200 12 200 10 200 12 
Bilaterals 1618 79 1288 77 1618 79 1288 77 
EU J 108 54 777 47 1108 54 777 47 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 200 JO 200 12 200 JO 200 12 
Germany 311 15 311 19 311 15 311 19 
Other bilaterals 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 2037 100 1663 100 2037 100 1663 100 
Balance of payments support - 1991 
Total Algeria 1 Bulgaria I 
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % 
us$ us$ us$ US$ us$ US$ 
IFI's 5607 50 3930 43 690 23 443 19 640 35 540 33 
IMF 4177 37 2825 31 390 13 293 12 390 22 390 24 
World Bank (policy based) 1430 13 1105 12 300 10 150 6 250 14 150 9 
Bilaterals 5600 50 5147 57 2290 77 1938 81 1168 65 1117 67 
EU 2190 20 1988 22 540 18 338 14 400 22 400 24 
USA 35 0 35 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 
Japan 850 8 633 7 300 JO 150 6 100 6 58 4 
Other bi laterals 521 5 487 5 0 0 0 0 104 6 95 6 
Debt relief 2004 18 2004 22 1450 49 1450 61 554 31 554 33 
Paris Club 554 5 554 6 554 31 554 33 
Syndicated loan 1450 13 1450 16 1450 49 1450 61 
Total 11207 100 9077 100 2980 100 2381 100 1808 100 1657 100 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Hungary Romania I 
-----
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % 
US$ us$ us$ US$ US$ US$ 
IFl's 1302 59 1302 60 2262 81 1020 67 713 49 625 46 
!MF 852 39 852 39 2012 72 845 56 533 37 445 33 
World Bank {policy based) 450 21 450 21 250 9 175 12 180 12 180 13 
Bilaterals 887 41 862 40 518 19 493 33 737 51 737 54 
EU 500 23 500 23 250 9 250 17 500 34 500 37 
USA 15 JS JO 0 10 0 0 0 0 
Japan 200 9 200 9 150 5 125 8 100 7 JOO 7 
Other bilaterals 172 8 147 7 108 4 108 7 137 9 137 10 
Debt relief 
Paris Club 
Syndicated loan 
Total 2189 100 2164 100 2780 100 1513 100 1450 100 1362 100 
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TABLE 3. 1. (continued) : Balance of payments support to recipients of EU macro-financial assistance by contributor, 1990-1995 
(in million of US$ and in percent of total commitments and disbursements) 
Balance of payments support - 1992 
-- - ~-
Total Albania I Estonia 
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % 
US$ us$ US$ US$ US$ us$ 
IFI's 1564 69 1193 71 48 29 28 23 116 57 109 69 
!MF 909 40 768 46 28 17 18 15 86 42 83 53 
World Bank (policy based) 655 29 426 26 20 12 10 8 30 15 26 17 
Bilaterals 708 31 476 29 115 71 95 77 87 43 48 31 
EU 423 19 298 18 83 51 83 67 46 22 23 14 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 120 5 79 5 20 12 9 7 20 10 13 8 
Other bilaterals 165 7 100 6 12 8 4 3 22 11 13 8 
Total 2272 100 1670 100 162 100 123 100 204 100 158 100 
Latvia Lithuania Romania II 
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % 
US$ us$ US$ US$ US$ us$ 
IFI's 215 56 196 68 245 53 194 62 940 89 666 85 
!MF 170 44 151 52 185 40 149 48 440 42 366 47 
World Bank (policy based) 45 12 45 16 60 13 45 14 500 47 300 38 
Bilaterals 169 44 94 32 217 47 120 38 119 11 119 15 
EU 91 24 46 16 114 25 57 18 90 8 90 11 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 35 9 23 8 45 10 34 11 0 0 
Other bilaterals 43 11 25 9 58 13 29 9 29 3 29 4 
Total 384 100 290 100 462 100 314 100 1059 100 785 100 
Balance of payments support 1994 
Total Albania II Algeria II 
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % 
US$ US$ US$ US$ us$ US$ 
IFI's 4086 27 2772 21 75 63 42 70 1397 19 1182 17 
IMF 3206 21 2072 16 60 50 34 58 1097 15 882 13 
World Bank (policy based) 880 6 700 5 15 13 8 13 300 4 300 4 
Bilaterals 11299 73 10357 79 45 37 18 30 5920 81 5666 83 
EU 952 6 336 3 41 34 18 30 335 5 201 3 
USA 100 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 350 2 185 0 0 0 0 150 2 95 
Other bilaterals 252 2 101 4 3 0 0 135 2 70 
Debt relief 9645 63 9645 73 5300 72 5300 77 
London Club 4920 32 4920 37 1120 15 1120 16 
Paris Club 4380 28 4380 33 4180 57 4180 61 
Other 345 2 345 3 
Total 15385 100 13129 100 120 100 59 100 7317 100 6848 100 
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TABLE 3.1 (continued) : Balance of payments support to recipients of EU macro-financial assistance by contributor, 1990-1995 
(in million of US$ and in percent of total commitments and disbursements) 
Bulgaria II Moldova I Romania lII 
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % 
US$ us$ US$ us$ us$ US $ 
IFl's 646 13 195 5 164 56 133 56 913 81 447 100 
!MF 521 11 195 5 104 35 121 51 713 63 247 55 
World Bank (policy based) 125 3 0 0 60 20 12 5 200 18 200 45 
Bilaterals 4214 87 4088 95 130 44 106 44 218 19 0 0 
EU 125 3 88 2 54 18 30 12 143 13 0 0 
USA 0 0 0 0 30 10 20 8 0 0 0 0 
Japan 50 0 0 40 14 30 13 50 4 0 0 
Other bilaterals 39 0 0 6 2 26 II 26 2 0 0 
Debt relief 4000 82 4000 93 
London Club 3800 78 3800 89 
Paris Club 200 4 200 5 
Other 
Total 4860 100 4283 100 294 100 239 100 1131 100 447 100 
Slovak Republic Ukraine 
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % 
us$ US$ us$ US$ 
IFl's 426 64 308 84 465 47 465 53 
!MF 346 52 228 62 365 37 365 41 
World Bank (policy based) 80 12 80 22 JOO 10 100 11 
Bilaterals 242 36 60 16 530 53 420 47 
EU 155 23 0 0 100 10 0 0 
USA 0 0 0 0 70 7 70 8 
Japan 60 9 60 16 0 0 0 0 
Other bilaterals 27 4 0 0 15 2 5 
Debt relief 345 35 345 39 
London Club 
Paris Club 
Other 345 35 345 39 
Total 668 100 368 100 995 100 885 100 
Balance of payments support 1995 
Total Belarus Ukraine II 
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements 
Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million % 
US$ US$ us$ us$ US$ us $ 
IFl's 1877 33 1770 34 270 79 163 81 1607 30 1607 32 
!MF 1477 26 1370 26 270 79 163 81 1207 22 1207 24 
World Bank (policy based) 400 7 400 8 0 0 0 0 400 7 400 8 
Bilaterals 3885 67 3443 66 70 21 38 19 3815 70 3405 68 
EU 330 6 38 70 21 38 19 260 5 0 0 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 150 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 150 3 0 0 
Other bilaterals 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Debt relief 3405 59 3405 65 0 0 0 0 3405 63 3405 68 
London Club 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paris Club 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 3405 59 3405 65 0 0 0 0 3405 63 3405 68 
Total 5762 100 5213 100 340 100 201 100 5422 100 5012 100 
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TABLE 4: Selected economic indicators TABLE 4 (continued) : Selected economic indicators 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Programme I Estimates Programme 1 Estimates 
GDP at constant prices (Percent change) Current account (Percent of GDP) 
Albania -9.7 9.6 9.4 6.0 9.0 Albania -65.7 -33.4 -13.5 ] I.I 9.7 
Algeria 2.2 -1.8 I.I 4.3 Algeria 2.9 2.1 -4.3 - 5.6 
Belarus -1 1.6 -20.0 - 7.0 Belarus -8.7 -11.4 -4.1 
Bulgaria -7.3 - 2.4 1.8 2.6 Bulgaria -9.3 -7.9 -0.3 2.3 
Estonia -19.3 -3.5 4.0 4.0 Estonia 7.6 -5.7 -9.0 - 10.6 
Latvia -35.0 - 15.0 2.0 0.0 Latvia 2.3 6.7 -4.6 -4.0 
Lithuania -37.7 - 16.2 1.5 3.0 Lithuania 3.4 -6.2 -4.3 -3.4 
Moldova -29. 1 - 8.7 -3 1.0 -3.0 Moldova -3 .0 -9.3 -9.2 - 6.0 
Romania - 13.6 1.3 3.9 6.9 Romania -8.6 -5 .5 -1.4 -4.4 
Slovak Republic - 7.0 -4.1 4.8 2.0 7.4 Slovak Republic 0.4 (2) -5.4 5.7 -2.3 4.3 
Ukraine -17.0 - 17.1 -23.0 -10.0 -12.0 Ukraine -3.5 -5.9 -6.0 -4.4 
Consumer price (end year) (Percent change) Official foreign exchange reserves (end year) 
Albania 236.6 30.9 15.8 10.0 6.0 (Months of imports) 
Algeria 31.7 20.5 28.0 22.0 Albania 0.7 2.2 3.3 3.3 3.8 
Belarus 1990.0 2220.0 290.0 Algeria 2.2 2.3 2.6 1.8 
Bulgaria 79.4 63.8 
Estonia 942.0 36.0 
Latvia 958.0 35.0 
Lithuania 246.0 163.0 
Moldova 2198.0 837.0 
Romania 198.5 295.0 
Slovak Republic 9.1 25.0 
Ukraine 2000.0 10155.0 
Fiscal balance (Percent of GDP) 
Albania -21.3 -15.9 
Algeria - 1.3 -9.2 
Belarus -8.3 
Bulgaria - 15.0 - 15.7 
Estonia 0.2 --0.7 
Latvia -0.8 0.6 
Lithuania 0.5 - 5.1 
Moldova - 23.4 - 6.8 
Romania -4.6 --0.1 
Slovak Republic - 12.8 - 7.6 
Ukraine -30.4 - 10.1 
TABLE 5 : Status of economic reform 
I. Price liberalisation 
2. Trade Ii beralisation 
3. Exchange regime 
4. Foreign direct investment 
5. Monetary policy 
6. Public finances 
7. Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
8. Financial sector reform 
122.0 32.9 Belarus OJ 0.3 1.5 
42.0 28.0 Bulgaria 3.5 2.4 3.2 3.3 
26.0 23.0 Estonia 4.5 4.0 3.2 2.8 
45.0 35.0 Latvia 2.0 5.6 5.5 4.8 
116.0 10.0 24.0 Lithuania 2.6 2.4 2.7 3.5 
62.0 33.3 Moldova 0.0 1.5 3. 1 3.0 4.0 
11.7 8.0 7.2 Romania 0.2 0.1 4.0 1.9 
401.0 138.0 182.0 Slovak Republic I. I 1.2 1.4 2.4 3.8 
Ukraine 0.2 2.3 4.3 3.7 
-13.6 -14.0 -8.4 I Programme targets as set in : July 93 (and revi sed in Aug 94) for Albania. 
-4.4 - 1.4 May 94 for Algeria, March 95 for Moldova. May 94 for Romania. July 94 for 
- 1.7 -3.2 Slovakia, April 95 for Ukraine. 
-6.6 -6.7 2 After fiscal transfers from the Czech lands, estimated at about 7% of Slovak 
0.0 0.3 GDP. 
-4.1 -4.4 Sources: National authorities and !MF 
-4.2 -33.4 
-9.0 -3.5 -5.5 
- 1.0 -2.8 
- 1.4 -3.0 0.5 
-8.2 -4.6 -5.0 
5.1 ALBANIA 
Most price controls and subsidies eliminated, with the exception of bread and flour. Electricity prices will soon 
be fixed by a regulatory body. 
No quantitative restrictions on imports. Export restrictions limited to scrap metals and wood. 
Free float since July 1992 within a unified exchange market. Early licensing of foreign exchange dealers and 
exchange bureaux. Current account convertibility. Agreement on the large external debt arrears to commercial 
banks reached in August 1995. 
Liberal legislation. Liberalisation of land sale to foreigners. Creation of economic free zones. 
Tight monetary policy. Use of bank-by-bank credit ceilings. Administrative guidance to ensure that interest rates 
remain positive in real terms. Treasury bill auctions (3, 6, 12 months). 
Tight fiscal policy until October 1995. VAT introduction delayed until July 1996. Removal of tariff exemptions, 
new classification, new tariff rates approved in May 1995. Revenue : 24.6 % of GDP in 1995. 
96 % of total arable land privatized. Distribution of temporary titles nearly completed in March 1996. Laws on 
land market, mortgage, collateral, leasing, subleasing, bankruptcy. Small privatisation in trade and services 
completed. Industrial enterprises: privatisation of small and medium-sized enterprises largely completed; 
progress with biggest state-owned enterprises. Mass privatisation process. Strategic enterprises and utilities 
offered for sale to foreign investors. Stock exchange. 
Two-tier banking system. State-owned banks to be privatized in the course of 1996 and 1997 with majority share 
offered for sale to foreign investors. Audits completed in 1996. New law on the role and responsibilities of the 
Bank of Albania. New law on the banking system with streamlining licensing procedures to facilitate the entry 
of new private banks. Several applicants. Important informal banking system. End of the state monopoly in the 
insurance sector. 
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TABLE 5 ( continued) : Status of economic reform 
I. Price liberalization 
2. Trade liberalization 
3. Exchange regime 
4. Foreign direct investment 
5. Monetary policy 
6. Public finances 
7. Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
8. Financial sector reform 
1. Price liberalisation 
2. Trade liberalisation 
3. Exchange regime 
4. Foreign direct investment 
5. Monetary policy 
6. Public finances 
7. Privatisation and enterprise 
restructuring 
8. Financial sector reform 
5.2ALGERIA 
Major price liberalisation and subsidies elimination in 1994. In 1995, more "sensitive" products (public 
utilities, basic food staples etc.) moved closer to total liberalization. The Competition Law enacted in 
January 1995 institutionalised the principle of free pricing while providing safeguards against monopolist 
practices. 
Further strengthening of the reforms initiated in 1994. No quantitative restrictions on imports left apart from 
a few products for religious reasons. Import restrictions on ten basic commodities abolished in May 1995. 
Following two devaluations in 1994, the foreign exchange allocation system has been substantially 
liberalised. In 1994, the Dinar was moved from a fixed peg to a managed float. A full-fledged interbank 
foreign exchange market was established as of end-December 1995. The premium on the parallel market 
has dropped considerably but remained substantial at 20% at end 1995. Total current account convertibility 
of the Dinar expected in the near future. 
A liberal foreign investment regime, including the banking sector, was adopted in 1993. However, apart 
from the hydrocarbon sector, no significant foreign investments have taken place in view of the security 
situation. 
Interest rates have been liberalised and the temporary ceiling on the commercial banks' spread was 
abolished in December 1995. Real rates, however, remained negative in 1995. The use of indirect 
instruments for monetary management was strengthened. Repurchase-auctions and a formal auction 
system for the sale of negotiable treasury bonds on the money market were established in 1995. 
The overall fiscal deficit in 1995 dropped further to 1.4% of GDP, mainly due to expenditure reductions 
(strict wage controls and subsidy reductions) with exchange rate depreciation also contributing to the 
budgetary improvement. 
Hardening of budget constraint, financial restructuring and signing of management contracts for the 23 
largest loss-making enterprises. Interruption of all on-lending to autonomous public enterprises from the 
Treasury. Launching of a restructuring programme for all public construction enterprises. Initiation of a 
divestiture programme for 103 small and medium enterprises with World Bank support. Enactment of a new 
privatisation law. 
Commercial banks are almost exclusively state-owned. Signing of performance contracts and 
recapitalisation of four public banks (out of five) in 1995. Capital adequacy ratio requirements gradually 
increasing. 
5.3BELARUS 
First price liberalisation in 1993. Most prices (except for state monopolies) freed by end-1994--early 1995. 
Phased increases of public utilities prices up to 80% of cost recovery levels by end-1995. 
In 1994 abolition of most import licences and export taxes, as well as surrender requirements for exporters. 
(However reintroduction in early 1996 of surrender requirements) . Early 1995 entry into force of a Customs 
Union with Russia. As a result, increase of import taxes up to the Russian external tariff. Partnership and 
Co-operation Agreement with the European Union (not yet ratified). 
In 1994 departure from Russian rouble zone. Only partial current account convertibility. Limitations on 
inter-bank currency operations. Managed exchange rate (informal peg) to the dollar at 11500 rbl/US$ over 
the year 1995. 
Free repatriation of capital and profits. Owing to political uncertainties, only minor flows of foreign direct 
investment. 
Two tier banking system with Central Bank conduct of monetary policy. In 1995 tightening of monetary 
policy. Weekly auctions for a large share of credits to the banking sector (60% ). Restrictive monetary policy 
and positive real interest rates proved successful to bring inflation down from hyper- inflationary levels to 
below 5% per month in second half 1995. 
Introduction of VAT in 1993. General government budget in deficit in 1994 (2%) and 1995 (2.3% ). General 
government revenue: 48 .9% of GDP ( 1995). 
Slow and delayed privatisation process. Only 6% of state assets and 12% of small firms privatised by end 
1995. Free distribution of vouchers to the population not yet completed. 
A large share of the banking sector privately owned. Prudential regulations progressively tightened, 
minimum capital requirement recently increased to 2 million ECU. Banks remain burdened with bad loans 
weakening their financial position. 
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TABLE 5 (continued) : Status of economic reform 
I. Price liberalisation 
2. Trade liberalisation 
3. Exchange regime 
4. Foreign direct investment 
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1. Price liberalisation 
2. Trade liberalisation 
3. Exchange regime 
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7. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
8. Financial sector reform 
5.4 BULGARIA 
At present some 50% of goods are subject to monitoring or control. Price controls still 
maintained on some public services (energy, telecommunications, water supply and 
transports). 
Export prohibitions have been removed. Average import tariff on industrial goods: 22%. 
Some import protection measures are still in place. 
Since 1991, unified and quasi-free floating exchange rate regime. Internal current account 
convertibility established (few restrictions). Limited BNB interventions in support of the 
lev. Official (Paris Club) debtrescheduling reached in April 1994. This was followed by 
the finalization of DDSR Arrangement with (London Club )commercial creditors in July. 
Liberal foreign investment legislation adopted in early 1992. Small amounts of foreign 
investment so far recorded owing to external debt problems, policy slippages and political 
uncertainty 
Bank credit ceilings were discontinued in mid-1994. In 1994 monetary and credit 
indicators used as nominal anchor. Limited open market operations. 
New rules on tax administration adopted in 1994. VAT entered into force in April , same 
year. Revenue/GDP ratio in 1995: 38% - budget deficit/GDP ratio: 6.7. 
Property restitution programme well advanced. A financial rescue plan for enterprises was 
initiated in 1994 but important problems remain. Privatization, although having been 
delayed, is nowproceeding in a more rapid pace. 
Banking supervision remains weak. Despite an early bank consolidation effort, substantial 
non-performing loans have been accumulated undermining credibility in the banking 
system necessitating tough structuralaction. 
5.SESTONIA 
Major price liberalisation in 1991. By end 1992, virtual completion of price liberalisation, 
including energy sector. 
In early 1992, abolition of most import tariffs (except few luxury goods), and of most 
remaining quotas and licensing requirements except for oil shale, clay, quartz. Import 
subject to a 0.5% administrative fee plusl8% VAT. Few exports tariffs. Free trade 
agreement with Baltic and Nordic countries, and with the European Union (as ofl. l.95). 
Current account convertibility. In 1992 departure from rouble zone. Since 1992, Estonian 
Kroon pegged to the DM, at a rate of eight Kroons to one DM, under a currency board 
system. 
Free repatriation of profits and proceeds of liquidation of investment by non-residents. 
Central bank responsible for operation of currency board (Issue Department) and, in 
exceptional cases, for emergency lending to banking system (Banking Department, 
responsible for managing reserves in excess of currency board cover). Restrictive 
monetary policy proved successful to bring inflation down from hyper-inflationary levels 
to two digit levels (29%, 1994 year-end figures) . Central Bank does not interfere with the 
commercial banks ' setting of interest rates. 
Already in 1991, personal income tax and VAT introduced, turnover tax replaced by 
corporate income tax; social security, natural resource and specific excise taxes. Balanced 
general government budget in 1995.General Government expenditure at 40% of GDP in 
1995. 
Small-scale privatisation virtually completed (about 1000 SMEs privatised). Wide 
distribution of vouchers, large-scale privatisation already advanced in 1995 ( 400 
enterprises privatised by year-end, out of 500 to be privatised). 
Two-tier banking system. Increased pressure on state enterprises to restructure through 
hard budget constraints and selective application of the bankruptcy law. Reduction of 
number of commercial banks from 40 to 24 through regular increases in minimum capital 
requirement following a banking crisis in Winter 92/93. Stock exchange introduced. 
Credit Institutions Act enhanced supervision and prudential regulation powers of Central 
Bank. 
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5.6LATVIA 
Major price liberalisation in 1991 and 1992 including for energy products. By end-1992, price 
liberalisation essentially completed, excluding utility prices and rents. 
All trade limitations abolished in 1992. Free trade agreements with Baltic States and Nordic 
countries, and with the European Union (as of 1.1.95). 
In July 1992 departure from rouble zone. Current account convertibility. Exchange rate of lats 
stabilised under managed floating system, informally pegged to the SDR. 
Free repatriation of profits and proceeds of liquidation of investment by non-residents. 
Substantial flows of foreign direct investment (165 million US$ in 1995). 
Independent central bank. Strict monetary policy resulted in lowest inflation rate among Baltic 
States. Credit policy through indirect instruments. Exceptional Central Bank 6-month credit 
line to the Government in 1995. 
VAT introduced in February 1992. In 1993 introduction of flat rate income tax (25%) plus a 10% 
surcharge on annual income. General government expenditure at 38% of GDP, and budget in 
deficit in 1995 (3.3%% of GDP). 
Well advanced small-scale privatisation. Privatisation agency established in 1994. Auctions of 
large enterprises started in November 1994. State enterprises not ready for immediate 
privatisationtransformed into stock companies, to be managed by a State Property Fund 
established in 1994. 
Two-tier banking system. 49 former branches of the Bank of Latvia either merged into a core 
bank (21 now forming the Universal Bank to be restructured and privatised later) or privatised, 
except for one which wasliquidated. Capital adequacy ratio increased in January 1994. Balance 
sheets of Universal Bank of Latvia and of Latvian Savings Bank recently strengthened. Nine 
bank licences withdrawn in 1994. Stock exchange already introduced. 
5.7 LITHUANIA 
Major price liberalisation in 1991, 1992 and 1993, including for most energy products. Level 
of subsidisation reduced for household heating (prices raised 50% in October 1994), electricity 
(prices raised 33% in October 1994), and transport. 
Export quotas and licensing removed partially in the course of 1992 and completely in June 
1993. All import controls and licenses removed. Since May 1994 import tariffs for a broad 
range of goods, representing two thirds of imports, suppressed. In July 1994 import tariffs on 
several agricultural goods raised to average 40%, and lowered to average 30% in October. Free 
Trade Agreement with EU entered into force on 1 January 1995. 
Current account convertibility. Lithuania left rouble zone in Spring 1992. Since April 1994, 
Litas pegged to US dollar at a fixed rate four litas to one dollar. 
Free repatriation of profits and proceeds of liquidation of investment by non-residents. 
Independent central bank (new central bank law enacted in December 1994 ). In April 1994, 
introduction of a currency board arrangement, according to which the money in circulation is 
limited to the amount of foreign exchange held in the central bank. Monetary expansion 
moderate in 1994 (45% year average growth). 
The tax system was reformed and now includes personal income and profit taxes, property tax, 
natural resource tax, individual excise taxes, as well as general sales tax. New value added tax 
replacing previous general excise tax. State budget in deficit in 1995 (3.4% of GDP). 
Substantial progress on small and large-scale privatisation through auctions, public shares 
subscriptions and voucher system. By January 1995, 76% of all companies eligible for 
privatisation (1/3 of state capital) privatised. Little progress on land privatisation. Autonomous 
operation of state enterprises promotes efficiency. 
Creation of two-tier banking system established in 1992. Central Bank and Commercial 
banking act enacted in early 1995, tightening prudential rules. International auditing of banks 
now compulsory. Stock exchange already introduced. In June 1996 new law denationalizing 
bankrupt Innovation Bank and establishing a bad loans agency. Foreign banks ' subsidiaries 
allowed as of 4 June 1996. 
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S.8MOLD0VA 
Full liberalisation of prices of goods and services with some exceptions (mainly energy 
products). 
All export quotas removed, including those on grain and grain products abolished on 1 
December 1995. Maximum import tariff lowered to 20 % by end November 95, with a few 
exceptions. Excise taxes on exports to non-CIS countries introduced in late 1995, but to be 
suppressed before adoption of the new IMF programme. 
New currency introduced in November 93. Freely floating and rather stable against the US$ in 
1995. Daily operated FX auctions at the Chisinau Inter bank Foreign Currency Exchange. 
Current account convertibility. Acceptance in June 1995 ofIMF Article VIII. 
Liberal regime: free repatriation of profits and proceeds of liquidation of investments within 
three months of the closure. Agency for Foreign Investment Promotion established in January 
1995. Partnership and co-operation agreement with the EU signed in November 1994. 
Conference on foreign investments in Moldova held in Chisinau in September 1995 to attract 
foreign investors. 
Relying on credit ceilings. Key objective: rapid reduction of inflation, based on introduction 
of new currency, enforced financial discipline and enhanced central bank independence. 
VAT introduced in 1992. Tax administration improved. Strong VAT receipts, including arrears. 
Receipts of privatisation far below expectations, because of a lack of domestic capital. On 
expenditure side, overruns due to higher-than-programmed spending in social sphere and to 
net lending by the Government, owing to the assumption by the Government of guaranteed 
loans to enterprises in default. 
New programme for 95/96 adopted in March 95. 2200 enterprises, representing about 70% of 
the economy privatised through the voucher programme, concluded in November 1995. 
Privatisation for cash not successful, because of a lack of domestic capital. Liquidation 
proceedings initiated against 20 state enterprises. 
Two-tier banking system with National Bank responsible for monetary policy and bank 
supervision. Regulation imposing provisions for bad loans approved in 1995. Starting from 1 
January 1996, all banks failing to keep their reserve level at a minimum ofMdl 4 million (about 
US$ 900.000) forced to close or to merge into a larger bank. 
5.9 ROMANIA 
The process of price liberalisation began in November 1990. By the middle of 1995, only 3% 
of all prices on consumer goods and services were administered (down from 90% in 1989). In 
the cases of industrial produc;er _prices and procurement prices on raw materials, the share of 
administered prices was equal to 7% and 27%, respectively. 
Full liberalization apart from a limited number of import/export quota/bans still in force, either 
for health reasons or for subsidised goods. Europe agreement with the EU in force since I 
February 1995. MFN status in the US. 
Limited current account convertibility. A market-based exchange rate regime was established 
in April 1994 but multiple exchange rates persist. Foreign exchange is available to individuals 
through private exchange bureaux. The authorities, however, have a history of backtracking on 
their measures to liberalise the foreign exchange market. After dropping considerably in the 
middle of the year, the premium in the bureau de change market had risen above 20% again by 
end 1995. 
Free legal environment for equity participation and profit repatriation by non-residents. Lack 
of progress with respect to privatization has limited the volume of investment inflows. 
The Central Bank uses both direct and indirect instruments for monetary policy management. 
Central Bank financing of Treasury deficits has almost ceased. Weak financial discipline of 
state companies. 
Good progress with fiscal reform and intorduction of new taxation systems, including VAT. 
Overhaul of the income tax system is expected by end 1996. Fiscal deficit is relatively low and 
under control. 
Little progress with medium and large scale enterprises privatization through the State 
Ownership Fund. Some success with small-scale privatization through buy-outs. Large 
inter-enterprise arrears hamper financial restructuring of loss makers which are a source of 
considerable quasi-fiscal pressure. A new attempt at restructuring the most problematic 
enterprises was launched at the end of 1995 with the support of the World Bank. 
In 1995, a reform programme for the banking system was agreed with the World Bank, a 
number of prudential rules were adopted and the interbank clearing system was reformed. 
Progress with the privatisation of state-owned banks remained very slow with only one bank 
in the process of being divested. In November 1995, trading began on the Bucharest Securities 
Exchange. 
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5.10 THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
95% of total turnover based on free prices, with regulation still in force in the areas of energy, 
public transportation, rents, telephone, telegraph and pharmaceutical products. 
Imports liberalized except for a few sensitive items subject to import licences. Export licensing 
remains for a limited number of products. Free trade agreements with the EC, the EFTA 
countries and the Visegrad countries. Customs union with Czech Republic since dissolution of 
the CSFR. A 10% surcharge on consumer imports was introduced in March 1994 and reduced 
to 7.5% in mid-1996. 
In October 1996, remaining restrictions on current account convertibility lifted and clearing 
system with Czech Republic terminated. Exchange rate pegged to a basket of Western 
currencies since February 1993. 
No limits on equity participation in enterprises by non-residents, except in the case of a few 
sensitive or defence-related sectors. Free repatriation of profits and proceeds from the 
liquidation of investment. 
National Bank of Slovakia, established in January 1993, operates independently from 
government. Slovak crown introduced in February 1993. Increasing reliance on indirect 
instruments of monetary control : remaining credit ceilings on banks abolished in January 1996. 
VAT reformed, excise tax system and personal income tax introduced in January 1993. General 
government revenues estimated at 51 % of GDP in 1995. 
First wave of large scale privatization completed by Spring 1993. Second voucher privatization 
scheme, launched in 1994, cancelled in mid-1995. Current privatization strategy emphasizes 
traditional methods (in particular, direct sales to managers and employees). Bankruptcy law 
came into effect in June 1993 but few companies have filed for bankruptcy. 
Two-tier banking system established in January 1990. Partial privatization of major financial 
institutions under first wave of large-scale privatization. State stakes in State Savings Bank, 
two largest commercial banks and largest insurance company to be sold off in 1996. Since 1991, 
several measures to strengthen banks' balance-sheets. Stricter rules for classification and 
provisioning of bad loans introduced in mid-1995. Bratislava Stock Exchange in operation 
since 1993 but financial markets remain underdeveloped. 
5.11 UKRAINE 
Limits on profit margins abolished. Reduction in number of goods for which price changes 
must be approved in advance. Increases in coal, electricity, gas, transportation and housing 
prices for households aiming at achieving cost recovery during 1996. 
System of state orders abolished. All domestic trade restrictions abolished. 1995 budget 
allocations for state procurement of agricultural products limited to needs of budgetary 
organizations and at market determined prices.Import regime free of quantitative restrictions, 
with few exceptions primarily for health and safety reasons.Maximum import tariff lowered to 
30%. Elimination of all export quotas and licences except for exports subject to VERs. 
Abolition of official exchange rate and unification of exchange rate determined at interbank 
auction market. High degree of current account convertibility reinstated. 
Decree of May 1993 grants tax relief ( exemption from income and profit tax for 5 years) for 
certain investments constituting at least 20% of a enterprise's charter capital. 
Allocation of all Central Bank credit to commercial banks by auction. No more directed credits 
issued. Central Bank refinance rate adjusted to ensure that it remains positive in real terms. 
Since 1992 gradual tightening and rationalization of budget including reform of VAT, enterprise 
and income taxes. Reduction of public expenditure from 72% in% of GDP in 1992 to some 45% 
in 1995. Ratio revenue/GDP: 40% in 1995. 
Mass voucher privatization programme launched at beginning of 1995. 
Some 1500 medium and large enterprises privatized. Programme will be accelerated in 1996. 
Progress with small-scale privatization. Decision to close some 15 loss-making coal mines. 
Bankruptcy procedures simplified in 1995. 
Central bank law submitted to Parliament. Plans to strengthen supervision and regulation of the 
banking sector. Provisioning against bad loans to be made tax deductible. Auditing in process. 
Profit tax for banks reduced to 40%. Deposit insurance scheme to be introduced. 
II. ALBANIA 
1. Introduction 
Supported by an IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) 
and by complementary financial assistance from the 
EC5 (ECU 70 million) as well as from G-24 bilateral 
members, Albania's macroeconomic and structural 
adjustment efforts were initiated in 1992 and have 
largely been successful. Following the decision by the 
IMF to provide further assistance in the form of a 
3-year (August 1993 - July 1996) Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), the Council 
decided on 28 November 19946 to grant Albania 
renewed macro-financial assistance up to a maximum 
amount of ECU 35 million, with the same aim of 
ensuring a sustainable balance of payments situation 
and strengthening the reserve position of the country. 
Albania had so far fulfilled the policy conditions 
attached to the present IMF ESAF when, in September 
1995, the IMF could not complete the second review 
under this facility, because of disagreement over 
budgetary policies. The ESAF is currently not 
operative but, with the proviso that a strong financial 
package would be implemented immediately after the 
May 1996 general elections, ESAF discussions could 
resume relatively quickly. 
2. Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth of 9 % was achieved in 1995. Agriculture 
has led the recovery, responding favourably to price 
reform and privatization. However, marketable 
surpluses still represent a small fraction of the 
production (12-20 % ) and marketing channels are 
improving slowly. Construction, transport, and other 
(private) services have made strong contributions to 
growth. Albania's industrial output has begun to 
recover. 
The target for the domestically-financed budget 
deficit had been set at 7 % of GDP for 1995. However, 
wage increases in the public sector in the second part 
of the year made this goal unattainable and the deficit 
instead reached 8.1 % of GDP. Starting in 1995, the 
central bank's financing of the deficit will be strictly 
limited to a maximum amount of 10% of government 
revenues of the previous year (for 1995: Leks 4.6 
billion or 2.8 % of GDP). Therefore, the government 
and the central bank have recently taken measures to 
support the development of the treasury bill market. 
Six-month and more recently 12 month treasury bills 
have been introduced, and the government has started 
the securitization of its outstanding debt. 
The total fiscal deficit, at 13 % of GDP, was still high 
in 1995. All categories of public expenditure have 
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been reduced in relation to GDP: public spending was 
equivalent to 33% of GDP in 1995, whereas in 1991 
it represented over 60 %. The structure of expenditure 
has been improved, shifting away from subsidies and 
social benefits towards public investment. 
Employment in the budgetary institutions has also 
been sharply reduced, by over one-quarter between 
mid-1992 and end-1994. Further reductions have 
been achieved in 1995 but failed to offset the impact 
on expenditure of a 20 % wage increase in the public 
sector. The tax base has been widened by the 
introduction of personal income, land and property 
taxes. VAT implementation at a 12.5 % rate was 
delayed until July 1996. 
As a result of tight fiscal and monetary policies, year 
on year inflation had fallen considerably, from over 
300 % in late 1992, to around 15 % by spring 1995 and 
to 6 % in December 1995. However, wage pressures 
in the public sector stopped this downward trend in the 
first months of 1996. Unemployment is also reported 
to have been reduced to 15 % of the labour force, 
substantially lower than its peak of 36 % in early 1993. 
The exchange rate against the dollar has been stable 
since the autumn of 1992 and even appreciated 
somewhat in late 1995 (94 Leks/US$ in December 
1995), reflecting in part the international weakness of 
the dollar. The renascent inflation in early 1996 put the 
Lek under pressure (104 Leks/US$ in April 1996), but 
interest rates were raised to reverse the tendency. 
Payments for current international transactions are 
virtually free from restrictions. 
Exports grew rapidly in 1993 and 1994, albeit from 
extremely low levels: in 1995, exports (at US$ 200 
million) corresponded to about one-third of the value 
of imports. The resulting deficit was financed by 
foreign aid and emigrants' remittances, the latter 
normally amounting to roughly twice the value of 
exports in recent years. The current account deficit, at 
US$ 21 million, fell considerably in 1995. However, 
this was mainly due to the level of remittances, whose 
sustainability is questionable. Foreign exchange 
reserves improved (US$ 240 million or 3.8 months of 
imports at year-end) even though the Bank of Albania 
had carried out the upfront cost of the foreign debt 
agreement (US$ 96.4 million) . 
3. Structural reforms 
Although most prices have been liberalized, price 
controls remain in place for a small number of goods 
and services. This is the case of flour and bread for 
5 Council Decision of 28 September 1992 (92/482/EC). 
6 Council Decision of 28 November 1994 (94/773/EC). 
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which, respectively, subsidies and price ceilings are 
in place. Further action will become necessary, but 
given the political sensitivity of this matter in a 
pre-election context, no moves are envisaged in the 
short run. In the case of electricity, the pricing policy 
is to be reassessed in the more global perspective of 
the reform of the energy sector. No more subsidies are 
scheduled for electricity in the 1996 Albanian state 
budget. 
With regard to external debt, Albania reached a 
satisfactory agreement (fixed price buyback at 20 % 
and a par bond option) with its external commercial 
creditors in late August 1995. The upfront cost of this 
agreement has been paid. 
A new system of customs tariffs entered into force on 
1 July, eliminating the exemptions on investment 
machinery, equipment, agricultural machinery and 
medical equipment, and introducing a new 
classification (six-digit harmonized classification) 
and new tariff rates (7 /25/40 percent). These changes 
had a limited impact on the 1995 budget revenue, 
owing to a late introduction (July) and the low rate (7 
% ) applied to previously exempted goods. Moreover, 
medicines as well as imports of materials that are 
re-exported have been exempted from tariffs. A 
backward move has been observed: the export of all 
kind of wood products, except furniture and charcoal, 
has been banned from early 1996. 
Since 1992, Albania has applied a market-determined 
floating exchange rate regime. In practice, current 
account convertibility of the Lek has been achieved, 
and the authorities envisage progressively lifting 
restrictions on capital transactions. The Bank of 
Albania's interventions in the foreign exchange 
market are guided primarily by its targets for net 
international reserves. 
With regard to fiscal and budgetary reform, VAT 
implementation (at a single rate of 12.5%) was 
delayed because of both technical and political 
difficulties. However, the VAT law was amended in 
March 1996 and the introduction has now been fixed 
for 1 July 1996. Employment in the budgetary 
institutions has continued to be reduced and its level 
has fallen below the requested level of 160,000 at 
end-June 1995, against 174,000 in August 1994. 
Concerning the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, the government decided in early 1995 to 
implement a broad mass privatization programme 
(MPP) for the medium and large-sized enterprises. 
This MPP has started and vouchers are being 
distributed; three rounds of auctions have already 
been held comprising 69 enterprises and creating 
15,000 shareholders. Moreover, over 3,000 small and 
medium-sized enterprises have already been 
privatized through normal auctions and the remaining 
few have been transferred to the MPP program. 
In the case of public utilities and resource-based 
enterprises, the Government has decided to give 
priority to sales to strategic investors. Legislation 
enabling the privatization of the electricity company 
(KESH) has been approved by the Parliament. 
Legislation also envisages a framework for the 
regulatory body entitled to formulate the pricing 
policy for electricity. Privatization is starting with the 
electricity distribution system, with pilot sales of three 
regional networks. 30 % of these distribution units are 
sold through the mass privatization programme, while 
for the remaining 70 % the Government is preparing 
the bidding documents allowing strategic foreign 
investors to become shareholders. Similar legislation 
for other sectors has been approved (mining and 
telecommunications sectors) or is under preparation 
(water supply sector). New investments in these 
sectors have been planned with the support of 
international donors. 
A law covering private investment funds and which 
sets out the legal framework for their establishment, 
licensing, operation and governance was approved in 
July 1995. Parliament adopted a law on sales of shares 
in October and an Albanian stock exchange came into 
operation in early May 1996. 
With regard to incentives for foreign investments, the 
creation of free economic areas has been adopted and 
foreigners have been allowed to buy land in Albania. 
Concerning the liquidation or privatization of the 32 
problematic Enterprise Restructuring Agency (ERA) 
enterprises, 5 of these have been privatized through 
mass privatization. Six of them are in the process of 
liquidation, while for the others a strategy of splitting 
them into smaller units before privatization in the 
MPP is being followed. Total employment in ERA 
enterprises was in the order of 10,000 in late 1995 
against 49,000 a few years ago, with a majority of the 
enterprises ceasing activity and the remaining ones 
drastically reducing their workforce. 
In the key agricultural sector, the Parliament approved 
in August 1995 the law on a "Land Market" allowing, 
in particular, the sale and purchase of land. Moreover, 
laws on mortgages, collateral, land leasing and 
administrative mechanisms to resolve land disputes 
were approved during 1995. With regard to the former 
state farm land, land "users" have received the full 
ownership rights, whereas, with regard to the former 
cooperative land, the right to lease, sublease and 
mortgage land has been established for those who 
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have already received temporary certificates of land 
ownership. These temporary certificates have been 
issued covering approximately 85 % of agricultural 
land. Their distribution has been continuing and will 
be completed shortly. Through the Land Market 
Action Plan supported by PHARE, the authorities 
have been accelerating the establishment of a land 
registry, a necessary condition for the issuing of 
ownership permanent titles. Concerning the 
agro-industrial sector, the privatization process is 
well under way: 2/3 of the "small and medium" 
state-owned agro-enterprises and 50 % of the "large" 
ones have been privatized. The remaining 50 % of 
"large" ones will be privatized later during the Mass 
Privatization Programme. 
In the financial sector, several major steps have been 
taken: 
- concerning the privatization of the state-owned banks, 
Parliament adopted on 16 November 1995 the law on 
transforming the state banks into commercial 
companies. Business plans were completed, but their 
scope was rather limited. With a more ambitious 
objective, a privatization feasibility study for the Rural 
Commercial Bank (RCB) and an external independent 
audit on the two other state-banks were carried out. 
Moreover, privatization advisors for the Rural 
Commercial Bank (RCB) have recently been 
appointed whereas those for the National Commercial 
Bank (NCB) will be appointed by June 1996. Based on 
bank external audits already completed, viable parts of 
these banks will be offered for sale to foreign strategic 
investors before the end of 1996. Negotiations are 
already under way for the RCB. The Savings Bank 
(SB) should be offered to private investors by July 
1997. The objective is to attract foreign investors to 
take over a majority share, whereas the remaining state 
share will be sold on the domestic market. 10 % of the 
banks capital will be sold in the form of privatization 
vouchers; 
- concerning banking regulation and legislation, a 
system of clearance and a chart of accounts are being 
prepared in line with international standards, with the 
aim of replacing the existing system during 1997. In 
February 1996, Parliament adopted the law 
determining the role and responsibilities of the Bank of 
Albania, including its relationship with the 
Government in terms of lending. Simultaneously, the 
law on the banking system was adopted, streamlining 
the licensing procedures and regulations for banking 
activity in Albania (in particular for co-operative 
banks and other financial institutions). Since then, 
several foreign and two Albanian private banks have 
lodged requests to open subsidiaries in Albania; three 
of them have already been licensed. A modern law on 
procedures on bankruptcy, including specific 
provisions for banking and insurance institutions, was 
adopted by the Parliament in October 1995. A new law 
on insurance, allowing private firms to operate, has 
ended the state monopoly in this area. 
4. Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
On 28 November 1994, the Council of Ministers 
decided to grant Albania further macro-financial 
assistance up to a maximum amount of ECU 35 
million in the form of a grant in the context of an 
initiative of the Group of Twenty-Four, aiming at 
mobilizing a total of US$ 72 million. This grant is 
complementary to assistance provided by the IMF 
under a 3-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF) initiated in mid-1993, with a view to 
ensuring a sustainable balance of payments situation 
and strengthening the reserve position of the country. 
The Community grant was to be disbursed in two 
tranches. The disbursement of the first tranche (ECU 
15 million) was effected in May 1995, following 
signature of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) laying down the macroeconomic and 
structural conditions attached to the grant. 
The approval by the General Affairs Council of 10-11 
April 1995 of the Commission's report on progress in 
Human Rights in Albania allowed the Commission 
services to go ahead with the implementation of the 
second tranche (ECU 20 million) of this assistance. 
The Commission concluded in July 1995 that the 
Albanian authorities had achieved satisfactory 
progress in their adjustment and reform process and 
that Albania, consequently, was complying with the 
conditions attached to the grant. Nevertheless, owing 
to Albanian difficulties in reaching the 1995 
budgetary targets and in agreeing new budgetary 
objectives in the pre-electoral context of 1996, the 
conclusion of a third annual programme under the 
current ESAF had been delayed and, as a result, the 
Commission decided to postpone the disbursement of 
its second tranche. 
Since then, the Albanian authorities have irrevocably 
fixed the date for the beginning of VAT 
implementation for 1st July 1996. Moreover, further 
significant progress in the areas of reform where 
delays had been experienced (privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, banking sector reform, land 
ownership certificates) have been achieved. These 
positive developments, in addition to Albanian 
assurances about corrective measures which would be 
implemented to cope with the worsening budgetary 
situation, have cleared the way towards the 
disbursement of the grant. 
III. ALGERIA 
1. Introduction 
Despite a favourable track record of policy 
implementation and some signs of macroeconomic 
stabilization, Algeria's pace of structural reform and 
the development of a dynamic private sector in 1995 
were seriously hindered by continuing political 
uncertainty and security problems which negatively 
affected growth, employment and domestic as well as 
foreign investment projects. Thus, the development of 
a political dialogue with the opposition is an essential 
prerequisite for progress in macroeconomic 
stabilization and for more decisive reform measures. 
A major turnaround occurred in 1994, in light of a 
further serious degradation of the socio-economic 
situation of the country. The Algerian Dinar was 
devalued by some 45% and the fixed exchange rate 
regime was replaced by a managed float, aiming at a 
stabilization of the real effective exchange rate. 
Prices, imports and access to foreign currency were 
substantially liberalized. Consumer subsidies were 
gradually reduced and a more effective social safety 
net was put in place. Financial discipline for 
state-owned enterprises has since been tightened and 
the first steps towards privatization have been taken. 
Despite diversification efforts, the country's economy 
is still heavily dependent on hydrocarbons (20% of 
GDP, 60% of fiscal revenue and 95% of exports). In 
this respect, Algeria is a "policy-taker" country, in the 
sense that its economic development prospects in the 
medium-term still rely heavily upon the development 
of oil prices in the world market which in 1995 
stabilized at a low level (approximately 15 dollars a 
barrel). 
The ambitious policy programme launched during 
1994 was confirmed by the new government which 
was formed in the aftermath of presidential elections 
in November 1995. Algeria's renewed reform efforts 
were supported by the International Financial 
Institutions and the Community throughout 1994 and 
1995. In May 1994 the IMF approved a one-year 
Stand-by arrangement of US$ 1 bn. This was 
followed by a three-year Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) of US$ 1.8 bn in May 1995. The first Fund 
review occurred in December and it was concluded 
satisfactorily, leading to a new "purchase" of funds by 
Algeria in 1996. 
In January 1995, the World Bank approved a US$ 150 
million Emergency Rehabilitation Loan. In late 1995 
the World Bank finalized a Financial Enterprise 
Structural Adjustment Loan (FESAL), which was 
actually approved by the Board in April 1996. The 
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total lending envisaged is US$ 400 million of which 
300 million for adjustment support and the rest for 
supporting agricultural and housing sectors. 
Arrangements on external debt rescheduling were 
also reached with both the Paris and London Clubs in 
1994 and 1995, respectively. 
In August 1994 the Community released the 
remaining second tranche (MECU 150) of its first 
macroeconomic loan in favour of Algeria, decided in 
1991. In December 1994 the Council adopted the 
European Commission's proposal for an additional 
MECU 200 macro-financial assistance, to be 
disbursed in two tranches. 
The conditions attached to the disbursement of the 
first tranche (notably further liberalization of imports, 
reforms in the financial sector and progress towards 
restructuring and privatization of public enterprises) 
are contained in the Memorandum of Understanding 
negotiated with the Algerian authorities in January 
1995. After reviewing the fulfilment of these 
conditions, the first tranche (MECU 100) was 
disbursed in November 1995. 
It was agreed with the Algerian authorities that the 
conditions related to the disbursement of the second 
tranche would be negotiated at a later stage in a 
Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding. 
Furthermore, agreement has been reached for a fast 
mobilization of existing grants under various 
co-operation protocols. Reinforced bilateral 
assistance is also envisaged under the Community's 
1996-1998 MEDA programme. 
2. Macroeconomic performance 
Despite some encouraging first results and the 
mobilization of generous external assistance, 
Algeria's overall economic situation in 1995 
remained quite fragile, reflecting the impact of a 
number of internal and external shocks, a small 
non-hydrocarbons production base, modest job 
creation capacity, growing security problems, a 
backward financial system and administrative 
resistance to reforms. 
In 1995, real GDP growth is estimated at 4.3%. This 
result was the first positive change in per capita GDP 
in more than five years. The increase in real GDP was 
driven mainly by strong hydrocarbon exports and by 
a rebound in agricultural production following two 
drought years. Growth, however, remained 
insufficient to have a positive impact on the high 
unemployment rate (25% at the end of 1995). Despite 
progressive (but still incomplete) price liberalization, 
the Dinar devaluation and subsidy reduction in 1995, 
the government managed to keep the annual inflation 
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rate below 30% through the use of a mix of 
administrative price control measures on basic 
commodities (which constitute the core of the basket 
upon which the inflation rate is calculated) and 
moderately restrictive monetary, fiscal and incomes 
policies. 
The fiscal deficit dropped further from 4.4% in 1994 
to 1.4% in 1995, reflecting the implementation of a 
number of restrictive measures aimed at compressing 
the upward dynamics of public wages and salaries, the 
reduction of subsidies and transfers as well as the 
increase in fiscal and duty revenues. 
The exchange rate system is presently based upon a 
sort of managed floating with limited Central Bank 
interventions in support of the Dinar, compatible with 
the availability of foreign currency reserves (which at 
the end of 1995 were equivalent to 1.8 months of 
imports, down from 2.6 months at the end of the 
previous year). 
The substantial devaluation of the Dinar in 1994 
coupled with a floating rate mechanism led to a sharp 
reduction in the gap between the official and parallel 
exchange rate. In early 1994 this gap was 250% and 
this contracted to around 50% as of mid-1995. 
However, the persistence of this gap (albeit declining) 
reflects an imperfect implementation of current 
account convertibility announced in 1994 and the 
continuing use of practices restricting the access to 
foreign currency by residents, particularly for tourism 
and small cross border trade purposes. The gap also 
fuels further devaluation expectations, unrecorded 
(and potentially destabilizing) foreign currency 
dealings and capital outflows. 
Interest rates are still negative in real terms which has 
a depressive effect on savings and weakens the 
confidence in the Dinar by encouraging a shift from 
Dinar to dollar denominated accounts and holdings by 
residents. 
The overall balance of payments situation 
deteriorated in 1995. During the first half of the year, 
a considerable external shock ( due to adverse 
exchange rate movements and deteriorating terms of 
trade) compounded the negative short term impact 
expected to result from external liberalisation. Faced 
by these challenges, the authorities chose to adjust, 
tightening demand management and increasing the 
rate of depreciation of the Algerian Dinar under the 
managed float, thus actually managing to achieve a 
small surplus in the trade balance (US$ 0.06 bn). 
However, this was more than outweighed by a 27.7% 
increase in interest payments. As a result, the current 
account continued to deteriorate, showing a deficit of 
5.6% of GDP for 1995 against a deficit of 4.3% the 
previous year. 
On capital account, some FDI went into the 
hydrocarbon sector. The country has virtually no 
access to the international capital market and despite 
London and Paris Club debt arrangements leading to 
the normalization of relations vis-a-vis Western 
creditors, virtually no new bank lending was made 
available to Algeria in 1995. 
Following the above-mentioned debt relief 
arrangements, debt service as percentage of exports 
dropped from 82% in 1993 to around 49% in 1995. 
But servicing residual debt is still a heavy burden for 
Algeria given weak oil revenues, higher prices in the 
world grain market, and declining foreign currency 
reserves. 
3. Structural reforms 
Stringent administrative import controls and foreign 
currency allocation have been abolished in April 1994 
and were replaced by a more liberal regime 
comprising a system of professional criteria for 
importers and a limited list of prohibited imports. The 
latter list has been gradually reduced and was 
abolished end 1994, except for goods prohibited for 
religious and security reasons. The list of goods 
subject to professional criteria is also being reduced. 
State monopolies on certain imports have also been 
eliminated. According to the new legislation, access 
to foreign currency has been completely liberalised 
for all visible current account transactions by private 
and public enterprises. Only imports financed through 
foreign credits are still subject to authorization. 
However, the implementation of these liberalization 
measures is imperfect and is delivering only mixed 
results, given, in particular, the presence of a growing 
number of unlicensed, informal traders who have no 
access to banks' foreign currency. Therefore they fuel 
informal foreign currency deals via private (tolerated) 
bureaux thus encouraging market segmentation and a 
persistent gap between official and parallel exchange 
rates. Compulsory surrender requirements have been 
lifted. Residents are allowed to open foreign currency 
accounts at local banks. There is no limit on the 
amount held and interest is offered at more attractive 
rates than for Dinar deposits. 
The legal environment for enterprises has improved 
considerably. A Competition Law was adopted in 
January 1995 which liberalizes the price regime and 
puts stringent limits on cartels and monopolies. A 
Commercial Code, introduced in 1993, has put private 
and public enterprises on an equal legal footing. The 
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Investment Code on Joint Ventures provides for full 
repatriation of profits. 
The restructuring of the public enterprise sector is 
based upon two strategies, financial and 
administrative restructuring and privatization. 
However, the reform process of public enterprises 
moved only slowly in 1995. 
In 1995, five public enterprises were granted financial 
autonomy and the Treasury stopped all on-lending to 
autonomous public enterprises. The authorities 
imposed a ceiling on the access to commercial bank 
credit for the 23 largest loss-making enterprises and 
initiated their financial restructuring under World 
Bank guidance and support. Performance and 
"management" contracts have been signed with 7 
other public enterprises in April 1995. A restructuring 
programme for all 94 public construction enterprises 
was also launched in order to strengthen the housing 
sector with a view to shifting construction activity in 
housing to the private sector, while reorienting public 
enterprises to public works. Some 88 local public 
utilities have been closed down. 
A Privatization Law was adopted in July 1995 and in 
August the authorities announced the intention to 
privatize over 500 public enterprises. The same 
legislation also restored to the original owners some 
previously nationalized land. A pilot programme for 
privatizing 5 hotels has been launched but results have 
been short of initial expectations, given that the 
present political and security situation is not 
conducive to private sector investments in Algeria, 
domestic or foreign. 
As part of the reform of the banking and financial 
system, the Bank of Algeria has strengthened . its 
supervisory capacity and established more effective 
prudential regulations and controls. The ~ive 
state-owned commercial banks have been audited 
regularly since 1992, institutional development plans 
put in place and performance contracts signed. On the 
basis of the audits, four banks were recapitalized with 
a view to increase their capital adequacy ratio (which 
is expected to rise to the BIS norm of 8% by 1999). 
Banks are now free to set their own creditor and debtor 
interest rates as a temporary ceiling on their spread 
was eliminated in December 1995. A new private 
bank was chartered in September 1995 but private 
involvement in the banking sector remains extremely 
limited in spite of a liberal investment regime. 
4. Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Following the agreement in principle between the 
Algerian authorities and the IMF in April 1994 and a 
request for further macro-financial assistance from 
the Algerian authorities, the Council endorsed the 
Commission's intention to release the remaining 
second tranche of the 1991 programme and agreed in 
principle on additional macro-financial assistance for 
an amount of ECU 200 million. 
The second tranche of ECU 150 million was 
effectively disbursed in August and the Commission 
proposal for an additional ECU 200 million 
macro-financial assistance, to be disbursed in two 
tranches, was adopted by the Council on 22 December 
1994 7. A Memorandum of Understanding specifying 
the conditions related to the disbursement of the first 
tranche of ECU 100 million was agreed with the 
Algerian authorities in early 1995. The structural 
reform conditions relate to further liberalisation of the 
imports and exchange rate regimes, reforms in the 
financial sector and progress towards restructuring 
and privatization of public enterprises. Furthermore, 
the Memorandum emphasizes Community concerns 
in the social sector and the synergy between 
macro-financial assistance and other Community aid 
instruments, with a view to facilitate the 
implementation of economic reforms in Algeria. 
After reviewing the fulfilment of these conditions, the 
Community decided the disbursement of the first 
tranche in November 1995. 
The conditions related to the release of the second 
tranche will be negotiated at a later stage in a 
Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding 
provided the IMF programme remains on-track. 
IV. BALTIC COUNTRIES 
1. Introduction 
The three Baltic states, who recovered their 
sovereignty in August 1991, had already initiated 
reforms under the past regime after the adoption by the 
Supreme Soviet of the bill on their economic 
independence in November 1989. In 1992, as they 
were already actively engaged on the way of reforms 
to a market economy, economic prospects worsened. 
The dismantling of trade relations among former 
Soviet republics and the increase of prices on energy 
imports from Russia to world levels resulted in a trade 
shock. External accounts deficits were expected to be 
unsustainable without international support. The 
three countries defined stabilisation and reform 
programmes covering the period mid-1992 to 
mid-1993 and concluded stand-by arrangements 
with the IMF. G-24 donors were called to contribute 
7 Council Decision 94/936/EEC. 
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to fill the remaining expected balance of payments 
gap for the programme period, estimated at a level of 
US dollar 105 million for Estonia, US dollar 210 
million for Latvia and US dollar 285 million in the 
case of Lithuania. On the basis of favourable 
prospects of support within the G-24, the IMP board 
approved the respective stand-by arrangements in 
September and October 1992. 
In November 1992, the EC Council8 approved 
macro-financial assistance of up to ECU 220 million 
for the three countries (ECU 40 million for Estonia, 
ECU 80 million for Latvia and ECU 100 million for 
Latvia) in support of the countries' programmes, 
corresponding to about 50% of the estimated balance 
of payments gap. The bulk of the remaining bilateral 
support within the G-24 group came from Japan and 
EFf A countries. Loan agreements and memoranda of 
understanding between the Community and each 
beneficiary were signed in early 1993. The 
Commission disbursed the first tranche (50% of the 
loan amounts) in March 1993 for Estonia and Latvia, 
and in July 1993 for Lithuania. The release of the 
second tranche was to be made following a positive 
evaluation of performance criteria, regarding both 
macroeconomic stabilisation aspects and progress of 
structural reforms, as set out in the memoranda of 
understanding. 
2. Recent economic developments 
Estonia 
After a sharp decline in 1992 and early 1993 the 
Estonian economy was emerging from 
recession by the end of 1993. GDP grew by 4 % 
in 1994 and about the same level in 1995 ( 4.5% ). 
Unemployment, at about 5 %, remained 
moderate.Macro-economic stabili- sation, after price 
increases which reached hyper-inflationary levels in 
1992 and 1993, was to a large extent achieved after 
the introduction in June 1992 of a currency board 
arrangement under which the monetary base is 
limited by the amount of hard currencies and gold 
detained by the central bank. A new currency, the 
Estonian Kroon, was introduced at the same time. 
This proved successful in stabilising the economy: 
inflation dropped and continued to decline from 42% 
in 1994 to 29 % in 1995 (year-end figures). 
Inflationary pressures remained strong, however, in 
1995, particularly in the area of services. Under the 
currency board arrangement central bank lending to 
the state is prohibited, which contributes to budgetary 
discipline. In 1995 government expenditure increased 
above the programmed budget, but this increase was 
counter-balanced by growing tax revenues and social 
security contributions. The financial balance was in 
surplus (0.8 % of GDP). Increased government 
deposits in the banking sector resulted in a slightly 
lower fiscal balance surplus (0.3% of GDP). The 
1996 budget envisages an almost balanced budget. 
Estonia has already implemented the bulk of 
structural reforms leading to a market economy. 
Prices and foreign trade are completely free. The 
small scale privatisation covering some 1000 small 
enterprises is now virtually completed. Out of the 500 
medium and large scale enterprises about 100 remain 
in the state 's hands and are expected to be privatised 
in 1996, with the exception of natural monopolies. 
Land privatisation, which was slow to start, is being 
accelerated. Financial sector reform appears as the 
most sensitive area. The Bank of Estonia has 
increased its supervision capacities and reduced its 
share of assets in the Savings Bank to 25% of the 
capital. The state also reduced below 10% its minority 
shareholding in commercial banks. Capital adequacy 
requirements are being gradually increased. An action 
plan was set up to restructure a virtually insolvent 
bank, the North Estonian Bank. 
The Free Trade Agreement with the European 
Community entered into force on 1 January 1995. 
External trade continued to grow at a high pace, 
particularly imports which increased in 1995 by 33% 
over 1994. Estonia's external trade with the European 
Union increased markedly after independence and is 
characterised by a large deficit on the Estonian side. 
The overall trade deficit considerably increased to an 
estimated US$ 690 million, or 20% of GDP. Owing to 
a positive services balance, particularly growing 
tourism receipts which grew to about US$ 150 
million, the current account deficit remained below 
this level (285 million dollars or about 8% of GDP, 
excluding official transfers). Estonia however 
succeeded in financing this substantial current 
account deficit with a large capital account surplus: 
for the third consecutive year the capital account was 
in surplus, due principally to high inflows of foreign 
direct investment of about US$ 200 million. Official 
foreign exchange reserves continued to grow and, at 
US dollars 580 million at end-1995, covered 
approximately 3 months of imports. Under the 
currency board arrangement the Estonian Kroon is 
pegged to the DM at a fixed 8 to 1 rate. This has led, 
given the two digit inflation level, to a relative loss of 
external competitiveness which remains sustainable 
given the low initial rate of peg of the Estonian Kroon 
to the Deutsche Mark and the moderate rate of 
industrial price increases. 
8 Council Decision 92/542/EEC (0.J . L35 J of 2 December 1992). 
In March 1995 the IMF approved a new 
fifteen-month stand-by arrangement for SDR 14 
million (US$ 21 million), on which the authorities did 
not make any purchases. 
Latvia 
After a sharp deterioration in 1992 and 1993, Latvia's 
overall economic situation had stabilised in 1994: 
growth was at about 1 %, inflation continued to slow 
down, falling to 26% at year-end, and the budget 
deficit remained within 2% of GDP. In April 1995, the 
IMF confirmed its support of the authorities' policy 
by approving a second stand-by arrangement for a 
13-month period. 
In 1995, the budget deficit had initially been 
programmed to remain at 2% of GDP as in 1994. 
However, Latvia's budget situation deteriorated in 
early 1995 and the budget deficit rose to 92 million 
lats (US$ 184 million) in 1995, or 4% of GDP. 
Additionally, a major crisis in the banking sector 
occurred in April 1995 with the main Latvian 
commercial bank, Banka Baltija, being declared 
insolvent, which alone accounted for 20% of the 
country's deposits. By mid-1995 eight other banks 
had been declared insolvent and a number of others 
were no longer allowed to take deposits. Altogether, 
the insolvent banks represented a total assets value of 
one third of the total bank assets in the country, or 
about US$ 1.2 billion. 
As a result of the crisis, broad money dropped by 10% 
over the second quarter. However, the high percentage 
of savings held in cash in foreign currencies obviously 
dampened its contractionary effect. GDP overall 
declined by 1.5% in 1995. Unemployment remained 
stable at about 6.3 % by end-1995. The Bank of Latvia 
maintained its conservative monetary policy stance, 
and inflation thus continued to slow down, falling 
from 26% in 1994 to about 23% in 1995. 
In the Summer the authorities adopted a package of 
measures to address immediate and long term needs of 
the financial sector, by enhancing prudential 
regulations and setting up a deposit insurance scheme. 
Other structural reforms continued in 1995. The 
Privatisation Agency became fully operational and 
230 additional firms were privatised in 1995. The sale 
of shares of the Universal Bank, one of the three main 
public banks, started in the third quarter of the year. 
The Free Trade Agreement signed with the European 
Union came into force on 1 January 1995. 
Imports and exports increased markedly in 1995, and 
reflected the continued shift of trade towards the West. 
As in 1994, the trade balance remained negative over 
the year ( 440 million US$ deficit, or 10% of GDP). 
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The positive services balance, mainly due to the 
transport sector, allowed for a current account deficit 
of about half the size of the trade deficit ( 180 million 
US$, or 4% of GDP, excluding official transfers). 
The authorities have successfully pursued a stable 
exchange rate policy with an informal peg to the SDR 
and, despite speculative attacks which led to a loss of 
foreign exchange amounting to 90 million US dollars 
in Spring, the Lats exchange rate remained broadly at 
its previous level in 1995. Under a two-digit inflation 
this translates into a real appreciation in the exchange 
rate. The overall competitiveness of the economy 
however seems to have been maintained. 
In order to cover its current account deficit Latvia is 
dependant upon private capital inflows, which 
remained substantial in 1995 in spite of the financial 
crisis. Thus, the damage of the crisis was contained 
and Latvia's reserves position remained relatively 
strong, with approximately US$ 600 million net 
reserves at year-end, which corresponds to around 5 
months of imports. The IMF programme went-off 
track after the Spring crisis and its Summer review 
could not be completed. In early 1996 the IMF staff 
concluded a new stand-by arrangement with the 
authorities which the IMF board approved in May of 
this year. 
Lithuania 
After four years of recession, Lithuania's economy 
began to show signs of recovery in 1994, with a 2 % 
increase in GDP. Growth for 1995, despite a drop in 
GDP in the first quarter of the year, is estimated at 
2.5%. The fundamental growth trend is now 
considered to be solid and is expected to be fuelled by 
investment and export growth. Unemployment, 
however, significantly rose in 1995 to about 7% of the 
active population, against 2% at the end of 1994. 
Inflation, which had peaked at hyper-inflationary 
levels in 1992, slowed down in 1993 and early 1994. 
On 1 April 1994, a currency board arrangement was 
introduced under which monetary growth is limited 
by the market value of gold and hard currencies held 
by the Bank of Lithuania. The reduction in inflation 
after the introduction of the currency board has been 
striking: price increases fell substantially in 1994, at 
a year-end rate of 45%. Inflationary pressures 
however remained in 1995, fuelled by the low foreign 
exchange rate of the litas and increases of public 
prices. As a result, inflation, with an estimated 35% 
(year-end rate), remained above the authorities' 
initial target (25 % ) in 1995. The fiscal deficit target 
(GDP 3.4%) for 1995 was broadly met, despite weak 
revenue performance in early 1995 which forced the 
government to cut expenditure. 
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Structural reforms have been further implemented. 
Prices had already been liberalised in 1993. The only 
items with prices remaining under government 
control relate to cases of monopolistic situations. The 
bankruptcy law, which has started to be implemented, 
was redrafted in early 1996 in order to make it more 
operational. Housing and small-scale privatisation 
are now virtually completed but, owing to delays in 
the establishment of the Privatisation Agency, large 
scale privatisation has been delayed until 1996. The 
financial sector reform is the most sensitive area. 
After the enactment of the Central Bank and 
Commercial Bank laws in early 1995 and the 
subsequent tightening of prudential regulations, the 
banking sector went through drastic adjustments and 
4 small banks ( out of initially 28) were declared 
insolvent and will in most cases eventually be 
liquidated. In December the crisis worsened when two 
medium-sized banks, Litimpeks and Innovative 
Bank, were also declared insolvent. The authorities, 
with IMP and World Bank support, prepared a new set 
of measures to consolidate the three major 
state-owned banks, to create a depositors insurance 
scheme and to review the commercial banking law. 
Compensation to depositors of the insolvent banks 
amounted to 30 million litas (i.e. half the total of their 
estimated losses), of which 20 million were 
programmed in the 1996 Budget. Parliament 
eventually approved, in June 1996, a law to 
re-nationalise Innovation Bank and to recapitalize it 
with resources collected from new issues of 
government bonds, amounting to the equivalent of 
250 million US dollars. Bad loans from the Innovation 
bank as well as from the state-owned Commercial 
bank and Savings bank were transferred to a newly 
established ad hoe bad loans agency. 
For the third consecutive year the trade balance was in 
deficit (US$ 335 million, or 4.5% of GDP), with 
exports increasing slightly faster than imports 
(respectively 15% and 13% increases) . The shift of 
trade towards the West continued, and was reflected in 
higher growth rates of west-oriented trade flows 
(more than 20% ). The weak point of external trade 
remains the energy balance (deficit: 5.7% of GDP), 
with imports of energy representing 40% of the total 
imports. The current account deficit remained near the 
level of 1994 (US$ 250 million, or about 2.3% of GDP, 
excluding official transfers). On 1 January 1995, the 
Free Trade Agreement with the European Union 
entered into force. 
The uncertainties in the area of the local banking 
sector translated into lower private capital inflows 
than in the previous years (US$ 135 million), and 
which did not counter-balance the current account 
deficit. In December the Central Bank lost US$ 45 
million of reserves as a result of the crisis of 
confidence after Litimpex Bank and Innovation Bank 
were declared insolvent. Significant medium- and 
long-term borrowing (US$ 230 million) was 
necessary to cover the remaining financing needs, out 
of which US$ 60 million were borrowed on the private 
capital market in December. At year-end official 
reserves were estimated at about US$ 800 million, or 
3.5 months of imports. 
The IMP Board approved in June 1996 the third 
review of the current programme, a SDR 134.55 
million three-year ( 1994-1997) Extended Fund 
Facility (EPP). This will contribute to consolidate the 
reserves and help finance key energy and investment 
related imports. 
3. Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Owing to the expected increasing demand for 
investment related hard currency finance, and to the 
track record of surplus of the three countries' external 
capital account, the Commission, after consulting 
Member States, exceptionally agreed in supplemental 
memoranda of understanding signed with the 
authorities in 1994 and 1995 to channel the bulk of the 
loans' second tranche through the banking sector, for 
sound bankable projects in need of hard currency 
financing. 
Economic stabilisation and progress of structural 
reforms conditionality criteria attached to the 
Community macro-financial assistance have been 
satisfactorily met in Estonia. The Estonian authorities 
however, after having considered drawing the loan's 
second tranche in 1994, eventually did not request its 
disbursement in 1995. 
In Latvia the IMP programme went off-track after the 
financial and budgetary crisis in Spring 1995, and the 
normal Autumn review of the stand-by programme 
could not be completed. In June the Latvian 
authorities requested the release of the Community 
loan's second tranche (ECU 40 million). Commission 
services subsequently went on mission in July to 
assess the situation and seek explanations from the 
authorities on their intended use of the funds. The 
authorities made it clear that the funds would be 
channelled to refund small depositors which had lost 
their savings in the bankruptcy of Banka Baltija. The 
Commission considered that this would be 
inconsistent with the general aim of the EC 
macro-financial assistance, which is to finance 
balance-of-payments external related needs and not 
to cover internal budgetary financing needs. This 
would also be inconsistent with the normal 
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conditionality criteria of the loan (including a 
satisfactory track record of the IMP programme) and 
with the undertaking of the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed in 1994 relating to the loan's 
second tranche. Accordingly, the Commission, after 
having consulted the Member States, declined the 
authorities' request to release the loan's second 
tranche in October 1995. 
In the case of Lithuania, the Authorities requested the 
disbursement of the second tranche (ECU 50 million) 
of Community assistance in early 1995. On account 
of progress of stabilisation and reforms, particularly 
in the areas of privatisation and of the banking sector 
prudential regulations, Lithuania complied with the 
conditionality criteria attached to the release of the 
second tranche. A Memorandum of Understanding 
relative to the use of proceeds under this second 
tranche was signed in July. As already foreseen in 
Latvia and Estonia, it was agreed that the use of 
proceeds of the second tranche would be earmarked 
for sound bankable projects and channelled through 
banks complying with Central Bank prudential 
regulations. Owing to the local banking sector's 
limited absorption capacity, it was agreed to split the 
second tranche in two separate ECU 25 million 
instalments and to release the first one, which the 
Commission disbursed in August. The authorities 
decided to channel the bulk of the funds through two 
medium-sized banks complying with central bank 
sound banking criteria. In September however the 
Commission requested a freeze in the use of proceeds 
of Community assistance pending improvements in 
the envisaged consultation process. In November, 
Commission services went on mission to Vilnius and 
requested further improvements in the management 
of the Community macro-financial assistance. 
In spite of internal tensions, particularly in the 
financial sector area, the Baltic economies have 
successfully implemented the core reforms leading to 
a market economy and have overall been performing 
remarkably well. The growth trend is now considered 
to be solid, and the level of external financing needs 
which had been anticipated when the IMP concluded 
the first generation of stand-by arrangements in late 
1992 has eventually, to a large extent, been covered by 
private capital inflows. The scope for external official 
macro-financial assistance has been more limited 
than initially anticipated, and the Commission thus 
did not release the full amount of Community 
macro-financial assistance initially approved. 
External tensions on the Baltic countries' balance 
of payments remain possible on account of 
growth-driven increasing trade deficits. The 
Commission will keep the situation under regular 
review. 
V. BELARUS 
1. Introduction 
Belarus, which had been one of the most developed 
republics under the command economy regime of the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU), embarked on reforms 
later than most countries in the region. A first limited 
set of reforms were launched in 1993 and were 
supported by the IMP with a Systemic 
Transformation Facility (STF) first tranche. 
Following the Presidential elections in July 1994, the 
authorities launched stabilisation reforms in the 
second part of 1994 and in early 1995. The IMP 
released the second STF tranche by end-January 
1995. The conclusion of a more ambitious programme 
in the form of a stand-by arrangement, initially 
envisaged for March 1995 was postponed pending the 
adoption of new reforms. The IMP board eventually 
approved a stand-by arrangement on 12 September 
1995. 
On 1 O April 1995 the Council of the European U nion9 
approved a Community macro-financial assistance to 
Belarus in the form of a 10-year loan, conditional 
upon the conclusion of an IMP stand-by 
arrangement, to support the country 's programme of 
macro-economic adjustment and structural reforms. 
On the basis of preliminary estimates from the IMP of 
the country's residual external financing gap for 1995, 
the amount of the Community assistance was set at a 
maximum of ECU 75 million. In addition, it was 
understood that the mobilisation of Community 
macro-financial assistance to Belarus would require 
that the country fully met its financial obligations to 
the Community in a timely manner. 
2. Macroeconomic performance 
The drop of production in Belarus was in the initial 
stage of transition lower than in other FSU 
countries, with GDP down by about 10% per year 
in 1992 and 1993, which was less than in Russia. 
However, a considerable drop (-20%) was recorded 
in 1994, one of the most severe in the countries in 
transition, followed by a further 10% decrease in 
1995. Investment dramatically declined over the last 
five years below 50% of its 1990 level. 
Inter-republican payments and trade in the FSU 
collapsed in 1993 resulting in a general deterioration 
of enterprises' situation in Belarus. Inter-enterprise 
9 Counci l Decision 95/132/EC (O.J . L89 of 2 1 April 1995). 
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and bank credits piled up, with Central Bank 
unlimited refinancing of the banking system, which 
triggered price increases reaching hyper-inflationary 
levels in 1993 and 1994. The general government 
deficit remained under control, however, below 2% of 
GDP in both 1993 and 1994. 
Belarus left the Russian rouble zone only in April 
1994 when the Belarus rouble was declared the only 
legal tender in the country. Stringent monetary policy 
was implemented from early 1995. As a result, 
inflation dropped from 40% per month in January to 
2.5% in June and, despite high increases of public 
utilities tariffs, the authorities succeeded in stabilising 
inflation which remained below an average monthly 
5% until the end of the year. Market mechanisms for 
the allocation of central bank credits were introduced 
in early 1995. The authorities pursued over the year a 
flexible interest rate policy aiming at maintaining 
positive and attractive real interest rates, so as to 
mobilise rouble deposits within the banking system. 
The positive real interest rates and a tight monetary 
policy contributed to stabilise the Belarus rouble in 
nominal terms at 11500 rouble per US dollar, and led 
to a significant appreciation in real terms against the 
dollar (+340 % over the year 1995). The budget 
deficit, at 2.3% of GDP for 1995, was limited within 
the level agreed with the IMF. The bulk of this deficit 
was financed internally. 
The current account which had been in deficit in 1993 
and 1994 (about-10% of GDP), remained negative in 
1995 (-3.5% of GDP). The competitiveness of 
Belarus' exports to the west was reduced by raising 
import tariffs to Russian levels as a result of the entry 
into force of the Customs Union with Russia in early 
1995. Despite fears of a loss of external markets, 1995 
recorded a high growth of exports ( + 75% ). Imports, at 
the same time, increased by 65%, and the trade 
balance, as a consequence, remained in deficit (-6% 
of GDP). Belarus progressively lifted restrictions on 
foreign exchange transactions in 1995 and thus moved 
towards current account convertibility. 
3. Structural reforms 
Initial progress in the area of structural reform has 
only recently been undertaken and remain a weak 
point in Belarus. Cross subsidisation of households by 
industry with regard to energy prices was high. A first 
wave of adjustment of public prices took place in 
Autumn 1994, when prices on communal services 
were increased. Rents, water and heating increased by 
factors of 42, 24 and 9, respectively. Further increases 
took place in early 1995. The number of 
"monopolistic enterprises", for which prices are 
regulated, was reduced from about 350 in mid-1994 
to 50 in mid-1995. As a result, most prices have now 
been freed. Public sector prices, which are still highly 
subsidised, were increased in July to 60% of cost 
recovery levels and further adjusted in December to 
80% of these levels. State orders in production and 
procurement have been reduced to 6% of the total 
output but remained particularly high in the 
agricultural sector. 
Most import licences requirements and the surrender 
requirements on exports had been abolished by 
end-1994 and early 1995. External trade however 
remained subject to some limitations. Export taxes 
which had been abolished in December 1994 were 
reintroduced in early 1995 as a result of the entry into 
force of the Customs Union with Russia. (At the time 
of writing this report the authorities have 
reintroduced, in early 1996, new administrative 
limitations on external trade and foreign exchange 
transactions). 
The banking sector is burdened with bad loans and 
remains globally inefficient. Progress was made 
recently on accounting standards, but external 
auditing remains scarce. The authorities recently 
raised capital requirements for banks from ECU 1 
million to ECU 2 million. It was further decided to 
proceed with the liquidation of two small insolvent 
banks. Inter-enterprise arrears reportedly accounted 
for more than 50% of GDP by end-1995. Actions to 
improve enterprises' financial discipline were 
adopted but seemed to be inefficient in the absence of 
effective bankruptcy sanctions, owing mainly to the 
lack of clear mechanisms to declare enterprises 
insolvent (a revised Bankruptcy law was later 
approved in May 1996). In the context of high energy 
prices, loss of markets and increasing payments 
arrears, profitability in enterprises has been cut by 
about 50% over the last three years. The number of 
loss-making enterprises increased significantly in 
1995 up to 29% of the total (April 1996 figures, on the 
basis of 1995 accounts). 
Privatisation is only at an initial stage. Enterprises 
representing no more than 6% of the total asset value 
had been privatised by end-1995. The privatisation of 
small enterprises, which has been the most rapidly 
conducted part of privatization in countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe was delayed in Belarus due to 
rigid auctioning procedures, and, by the end of 1995, 
only 12% of small enterprises had been privatised. A 
voucher privatisation programme approved in 1994 
was designed to cover the subscription of 50% of the 
total assets to be privatised, but the distribution of 
vouchers to the population, which was to be 
completed by end-1995 was substantially delayed. 
The privatisation process overall slowed down m 
1995. 
The process of reforms in agriculture has also been 
slow. Agricultural prices were only freed in early 
1995, while input prices of the agricultural sector had 
been liberalised earlier, leading to a squeeze in 
profitability of the state-owned farms and to the 
accumulation of arrears, in particular on energy 
supplies. About 20% of the sovkhozes and kolkhozes 
farms were transformed into joint-stock enterprises. 
However, privatisation had not yet started by 
end-1995 and is likely to be particularly complicated 
under such difficult financial circumstances. There is 
further scope for reform of the ownership status of 
agricultural land, which by law is the state's property 
and can only be leased for 99 years, without 
possibility to sell or mortgage leases. 
4. Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
After approval on 12 September 1995 by the IMF 
board of the first stand-by arrangement with Belarus, 
in late September, Commission services went on 
mission to Belarus to assess the economic and 
financial situation and discuss with the authorities of 
the country the terms and conditions of the 
Community macro-financial assistance. 
A Memorandum of Understanding setting out the 
macro-economic and structural transformation 
conditions attached to the Community assistance was 
agreed. Beyond the respect of the macro-economic 
performance criteria foreseen in the IMF stand-by 
arrangement, the Belarus authorities undertook 
significant commitments in several areas of structural 
reform (price liberalisation, privatisation and 
enterprise reform, financial discipline of enterprises 
and banking reform), on which progress will be 
essential for the disbursement of the second tranche of 
the assistance. 
Over the programme period of the IMF stand-by 
arrangement (July 1995 - June 1996) the country's 
external financing needs have been estimated at about 
US$ 600 million, almost half of which would be 
covered by the IMF. The Community contribution, 
taking into account the revised residual gap, was set at 
ECU 55 million and, matched together with the other 
bilateral donors' contributions, contributed to fully 
cover the residual balance-of-payments financing 
gap. The amount of the first tranche was set at ECU 30 
million, and disbursement took place in December 
1995. 
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VI. BULGARIA 
1. Introduction 
In 1995, the Bulgarian economy witnessed continued, 
modest progress in terms of stabilization and growth 
both in the public and private sector, essentially 
reflecting a relatively unambitious policy programme 
launched by the new Government, following the 
December 1994 elections. On the other hand, 
developments in the area of structural reform 
continued to disappoint, particularly as regards the 
adoption of measures aimed at accelerating 
privatization and addressing significant managerial 
and financial problems of the domestic banking sector 
which continues to be overburdened by a huge 
number of non-performing loans. 
The insufficient progress on overall economic reform 
and lack of credibility in the government's policy 
programme for 1995 led to a declining confidence of 
the International Financial Institutions, Western 
commercial banks and private investors. 
The deterioration in the western perception of 
Bulgaria's financial risk and a number of fundamental 
reserves repeatedly expressed by the IFis on the pace 
of the country's structural adjustment in 1995 was a 
major setback for the Bulgarian authorities, 
particularly if one takes into account that in 1994 both 
the IMF, the World Bank and western commercial 
creditor banks agreed on a major, global assistance 
package in favour of Bulgaria. In fact, in April 1994 
the Fund approved a twelve-month Stand-by facility 
worth 97 million associated with a Systemic 
Transformation Facility for US$ 324 million and in 
September, same year, it decided, together with the 
World Bank, further to augment its financial 
contribution by US$ 225 million. Moreover, in April 
1994 a Paris Club debt rescheduling arrangement was 
agreed with official creditors and this was followed by 
a debt and debt service reduction programme (DDSR) 
agreed with Western commercial banks in July. 
In the event, the Fund's assistance was suspended in 
late 1994 and failure to reach a new agreement for 
further funding in 1995, due to disagreements on the 
compliance of the Bulgarian government with the 
Fund and the World Bank's macro-economic and 
structural adjustment conditions led to a further 
worsening of the country's external financial position 
at the end of 1995 and during the beginning of 1996. 
Continuing absence of external financial assistance, 
very low foreign direct investment (FDI), 
(particularly if compared with other central and 
Eastern European countries) and the steady erosion in 
the country's foreign currency reserves has brought 
Bulgaria again on the verge of an external payment 
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crisis. And this is particularly disturbing, in view of 
huge external debt-related obligations falling due in 
1996 and beyond (in excess of US$ 1 bn a year). 
In the framework of the G-24 coordination process, 
the Community decided in April 199410 to reconfirm 
its commitment of a loan of ECU 110 million, decided 
in October 1992. The release of a first tranche (ECU 
70 million) took place in December 1994. 
2. Macroeconomic performance 
The policy programme for 1995, approved only in 
May by the newly elected government, was a rather 
uncertain and unclear compromise between the 
demand on the one hand, to rein in high inflation via 
moderately restrictive monetary, income and fiscal 
policies, attain exchange rate stabilization, sustain 
output growth, investment and export and, on the 
other, to minimize the social costs of the country's 
economic transformation by postponing privatization 
and granting a generous social safety net. 
Key measures aiming at enhancing financial 
discipline in selected large loss-making state owned 
enterprises or, if required, liquidating them, 
rehabilitating banks and strengthening bank 
supervision were either postponed or insufficient, 
thereby jeopardizing the sustainability of 
macroeconomic stabilization. 
After five years of recession, the economy began a 
recovery in 1994. Real GDP grew by 1.4%, followed 
by an increase of 2.6% in 1995. A sharp depreciation 
of the lev in Spring 1994 boosted exports and 
industrial output, while imports were reduced. The 
foreign trade balance swung from a deficit of almost 
US$ 1 billion in 1993 to a surplus of over US$ 400 
million in 1995. Reserves of foreign exchange held by 
the central bank rose from US$ 0.6 billion at the start 
of 1994 to US$ 1.5 billion by mid-1995. 
Industrial production increased by 5% in 1994. The 
rise in output was concentrated in chemicals and basic 
metallurgy. These sectors were able to expand 
exports, their competitive advantage deriving from 
the currency depreciation and also from cheap energy. 
Up until very recently, energy prices remained below 
world levels. 
Other macroeconomic indicators also pointed to 
positive economic developments. The budget deficit, 
which had been in double digits as a percentage of 
GDP during the early years of the 1990s, was cut to 
7% in 1994 and 1995. Having peaked at over 16% of 
the labour force in early 1994, the unemployment rate 
fell to under 11 % in mid-1995. The rate of inflation 
slowed, from an average monthly rate in the range of 
4 to 6% during 1992-1994, to below 2 % per month in 
Spring and Summer 1995. 
The reduction in inflation was helped by a prolonged 
period of stability in the nominal exchange rate, but 
also by increased Government intervention in 
markets, reversing earlier liberalization measures. 
Weighted by their share in the consumer price index 
"basket", approximately 50% of goods are now 
subject to some form of official monitoring or control. 
One consequence of these measures, combined with 
low domestic wheat purchase prices and ineffective 
export controls, is the emergence of bread queues. 
In general, the improvement in macroeconomic 
performance was not based on solid microeconomic, 
or structural foundations. In the financial and 
enterprise sectors, lack of progress in restructuring 
and privatization contributed to the development of a 
symbiotic relationship between banks and companies. 
Unprofitable enterprises with loan arrears continued 
to have access to credit from banks. Banks continued 
lending to enterprises in the expectation - based on 
past experience - that the state would ultimately bail 
them out.The central bank implicitly colluded with 
this 
situation by providing uncollateralized loans to 
commercial banks. 
By the second half of 1995, there were increasing 
signs that the economic situation was unsustainable. 
The growth in industrial output slowed to below 2% 
for the year. The price advantage conferred by the 
Spring 1994 currency depreciation was eroded by the 
subsequent exchange rate stability and the differential 
between domestic and foreign cost increases. 
Consumer price inflation accelerated somewhat, and 
the exchange rate began to come under pressure. 
Foreign exchange reserves declined as the central 
bank intervened in support of the lev. 
The country is regularly meeting its external 
debt-related obligations stemming from the 
implementation of the Paris Club debt rescheduling 
arrangement and DDSR arrangement with the 
London Club creditor banks. In 1995, debt-related 
payments amounted to some US$ 718 million. 
Following the arrangements, Bulgaria's relations with 
the international financial community have been 
restored but the recent eruption of a new financial 
crisis in the country's banking system and declining 
confidence in the currency has again increased 
Bulgaria's financial risk with depressive effects on the 
value of "Brady bonds". 
IO COM(94)1 18 Final 94/0103 (CNS) of2 1 April 1994. 
3. Structural reforms 
Despite a number of constraints, policy slippages 
and weak management, Bulgaria was in 199 5 
successful in preserving previous policy 
achievements such as trade liberalization, current 
account convertibility and a liberalized exchange 
rate regime. Undoubtedly, maintaining this "acquis" 
may become more problematic particularly in view 
of the country's new financial fragility, exchange 
rate volatility, loss of confidence on the lev and the 
insufficient speed in the structural adjustment 
process. 
The progress in trade liberalization has been 
encouraging but uneven. In 1995, Bulgaria 
implemented a liberalized customs policy (in 
particular in trade with the EU) but at the same time 
it adopted a number of temporary import restrictions 
aimed at protecting selected domestic industries and 
agriculture, such as minimum import prices, 
restrictive import licenses, tariff quotas etc. 
Bulgaria still operates export quotas, export fees and 
export taxes on selected goods. Occasional export 
bans were imposed in 1993 on industrial products but 
were eventually lifted in July 1995. Bulgaria's Interim 
Association Agreement with the EU entered into force 
on January 1, 1994. 
The progressive adoption of an outward-oriented 
trade regime has been associated with efforts aimed at 
further liberalizing the exchange rate regime. A major 
liberalization was introduced in February 1994 
whereby foreign exchange ceilings for current 
personal payments (tourism etc.) by residents have 
been raised significantly and current account 
convertibility is ensured for trade related payments. 
Some restrictions on current payments and transfers 
are however still in force. Residents are allowed to 
hold foreign currency deposit accounts ( export 
proceeds are subject to repatriation but not a surrender 
requirement) . Some inter-governmental clearing and 
barter arrangements with third countries were also 
terminated in 1995. 
As regards the reform of the state enterprise sector, the 
new government has pursued its strategy based upon 
three main "pillars", i.e. the implementation of 
financial rescue plans for state enterprises (SO Es), 
enterprise restructuring and privatization. Moreover, 
policy implementation was delayed by political 
conflict, policy and administrative shortcomings, lack 
of commitment to harden budget constraints on SOEs, 
insufficient financial resources and a weak banking 
system. In this respect, 1995 has been a sort of 
transition year towards a more decisive and ambitious 
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reform programme which presently is being prepared, 
for implementation in 1996. 
The financial rescue strategy lays its foundation on a 
law passed in December 1993 authorizing the 
government to issue long-term bonds in both 
domestic and foreign currency aimed at replacing 
uncollectable lev and dollar-denominated loans and 
interest arrears accumulated in banks' portfolios by 
end of 1991. Loans to state enterprises will therefore 
be borne by the government which eventually may 
convert them into equity or decide for their write-off 
or rescheduling as soon as companies are restructured 
or privatized. In the end of 1995, Bulgaria had 
concluded some 77 privatization deals where 
domestic debt bonds were us~d in debt-equity swaps 
amounting to 2.9 bn leva. Few more privatizations 
were also carried out through debt-for-equity swaps 
with the use of government "Brady bonds" (issued on 
the occasion of the DDRS arrangement) held by 
Western investors. 
In the field of restructuring, steps were taken late in 
1995 with a view to strengthening SOEs' financial 
discipline. Loss reduction and rationalization plans 
were prepared as well as a list for closing non viable 
enterprises or to put them into "financial isolation", 
implying that all banks would be prohibited from 
extending further loans to them. However, these plans 
were not implemented. 
The privatization programme approved in June 1995 
listed some 600 eligible firms but at the same time it 
indicated some key sectors (such as energy, railways, 
mining etc.) which would be excluded from the 
programme. Large SOEs will be only partly 
privatized, reflecting the new government strategy to 
keep a significant state control in any sizeable firm. In 
1995 the deals ( out of 170 deals originally envisaged 
for 1995) with total proceeds of 12.1 bn leva (of which 
only 3 bn paid in cash and the rest by swapping 
government foreign and domestic debt bonds into 
enterprise equity). 
Furthermore, in 1995 a mass privatization scheme 
was launched, involving some 1000 public 
enterprises. Sale of vouchers began in January 1996 
and sell-off tenders are expected to be issued by the 
autumn. 
The situation of the Bulgarian banking system 
worsened considerably during 1995 and the 
beginning of 1996 reflecting continuing 
undercapitalization, inadequate management, 
insufficient supervision by the BNB, lack of financial 
discipline ("easy credit"), fragmentation and a 
growing amount of non performing loans to 
enterprises. Despite some measures taken in 1994 and 
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1995 focusing on the strengthening of the bank 
supervision capability at the BNB and implementing 
a bank consolidation programme by the Bank 
Consolidation Company (BCC), the situation 
deteriorated so much (particularly in two main banks, 
Mineralbank and Economicbank) that presently the 
country's financial system is on the merge of collapse. 
In order to address the problem of the banking system, 
the Bulgarian authorities presently envisage a number 
of new wide-reaching measures such as limiting new 
credits by the BNB, further strengthening of bank 
superv1s1on, removal from office of banks' 
administrators and bank licenses revocation. More 
medium-term strategies being considered include the 
closure on financial stabilization of public enterprises 
which are the biggest debtors to these two "ailing" 
banks and, in parallel, their financial restructuring and 
recapitalization, in view of their subsequent 
privatization. 
4. Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The disbursement of the ECU 110 million 
Community loan decided in October 1992 in the 
framework of G-24, as a complement to the IMP 
assistance to Bulgaria, was delayed as the 1992 
stand-by arrangement with the Fund went off track. 
For the same reason no other G-24 assistance was 
released under this initial package. At the end of 1993 
conditions were restored for the resumption of 
EU/G-24 assistance to Bulgaria. Following the 
adoption of a new IMP stand-by arrangement, on May 
16, 1994, the Council agreed with the Commission 
that the 1992 decision on Community 
macro-financial assistance to Bulgaria could be 
re-activated in the context of the new programme. 
The release of a first tranche (ECU 70 million) took 
place in December 1994 on the basis of the approval 
of the new IMP Stand-by and the debt relief 
arrangement agreed between creditors. The release of 
the second tranche is conditional upon observance by 
Bulgaria of standard macro-economic performance 
criteria including a satisfactory track record of the 
IMP Stand -by, a proper implementation of DDSR 
operation and progress with structural reform. 
VII. MOLDOVA 
1. Introduction 
On 13 June 1994 the Council of the European Union 
decided to grant the Republic of Moldova a loan of 
ECU 45 million with a maximum duration of ten 
years 11 to assist the country in its efforts to transform 
its economy to a market economy and to strengthen 
the reserve position of the central bank. The 
Community loan was part of an overall package 
mobilised by the international donor community in 
favour of Moldova to complement the resources 
provided by the IMP and the World Bank. The first 
tranche of the loan, amounting to ECU 25 million, was 
disbursed in December 1994. The disbursement of the 
second tranche which was subject to the fulfilment of 
conditions specified in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) attached to the loan 
agreement, took place in August 1995. 
2. Macroeconomic performance 
Following the introduction, in November 1993, of its 
national currency - the Moldovan leu, Moldova has 
made a decisive tum towards financial stabilisation in 
the context of the 15-month economic programme 
supported by an IMP stand-by arrangement 
(approved in December 1993) and complementary 
assistance from the international community, 
including the ECU 45 million Community loan. 
In March 1995, a new stand-by arrangement was 
approved by the IMP to support the 1995 economic 
programme of the Moldovan government. The 
objectives of this programme were the consolidation 
of financial stabilisation and the implementation of 
structural transformation measures to restore 
economic growth. 
After a 31 % decline in GDP in 1994, due to severe 
weather conditions and to the continuing disruptions 
to output and trade associated with the collapse of 
central planning, Moldova's economic recession 
appeared to have bottomed out and preliminary 
estimates indicate that real GDP, including that of the 
region ofTransnistria, fell by 3 percent in 1995, which 
suggests a modest rise in activity in the economy 
excluding Transnistria. This improvement was 
partly due to a recovery in the important agricultural 
sector with the return of normal climatic conditions -
a rise of some 4% was registered, but also to a 
reduction in the rate of decline of industrial 
production, which is estimated to have dropped by 
"only" 10%. Official unemployment remained 
relatively low, i.e. at some 2% by end-1995, but a lot 
of workers were on unpaid leave and the actual 
unemployment figure far exceeded 10%. Real wages 
rose in 1995 but dollar wages, which averaged US$ 32 
per month, remained low compared to those of 
neighbouring countries. 
The 1995 programme's key monetary objective was to 
cut inflation to a sustainable, low level through tight 
11 Counci l Decision 94/346/EC. 
credit policy. The National Bank of Moldova (NBM) 
successfully achieved this aim in the first half of 1995: 
monthly rates below 0.75% were registered, 
compared to annual inflation of about 800% in 1993 
and 120% in 1994. However, inflationary pressures 
re-emerged in the autumn of 1995. These were partly 
due to increases in administered prices and seasonal 
increases in food prices, but also to strong capital 
inflows, which were unsterilized since the NBM was 
reluctant to allow a significant appreciation of the leu. 
In the fourth quarter, as the inflationary consequences 
of these policies were becoming apparent, the central 
bank tightened monetary policy, which was reflected 
in upward pressure on interest rates. With an average 
monthly rate of 3.5% between September and 
December, inflation reached 24% for the whole year, 
the lowest in the CIS. 
The fiscal performance improved in 1995, with the 
general government cash deficit falling from 9% of 
GDP in 1994 to 5.5% in 1995, not so far from the 3.5% 
official target. The deficit was financed by 
higher-than-expected net foreign financing- mainly 
postponement of repayments due to Russia - and by 
higher-than-expected sales of government securities. 
A severe control of expenditure - falling from 30.2% 
of GDP in 1994 to 28.5% in 1995 - was necessary to 
make this reduction possible. On the revenue side, 
VAT receipts and land tax collections were 
particularly strong. Revenue collection remained 
insufficient, however- 24% of GDP against 23.5% in 
1994 - and privatisation receipts were far below 
expectations, because of a lack of domestic capital. 
Both revenue and expenditure arrears - including 
almost all wage arrears - were reduced as a percentage 
of GDP. 
The balance of payments remained under severe 
pressure in the first half of 1995, primarily because of 
the continued impact of the terms-of-trade shock 
caused by the increase in imported energy prices to 
world market levels. In the second half of the year, 
however, a better-than-expected export performance 
coupled with an important reduction in energy 
imports resulted in the trade balance showing only a 
small deficit. For the whole year, the current account 
deficit was just over US$ I 00 million, or 6% of GDP. 
Moldova was still highly dependent on foreign 
assistance, medium- and long-term loans 
representing an important part of capital inflows in 
1995. Disbursements of assistance came from the EU, 
the USA, Japan and the Bretton Woods institutions 
for a gross amount of some US$ 120 million. Direct 
investment remained low at US$ 22 million in 1995, 
to be compared to US$ 18 million in 1994. 
Complementary to this amount, the balance of 
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payments recorded in 1995 a US$ 41 million foreign 
investment representing equity swapped for debt to 
the Russian company Gazprom. Gross reserves of 
the central bank reached about US$ 260 million by 
end-1995, or the equivalent of 4 months of imports, 
compared to 3 months at end-1994 and 1.4 months at 
the end of 93. 
By the end of June 1995, Moldova accepted the 
obligations of Article VIII, sections 2, 3 and 4 of the 
IMF's Articles of Agreement and has since then 
maintained an exchange system free of restrictions on 
payments and transfers for current international 
transactions. The Moldovan leu, introduced in 
November 1993, was remarkably stable during the 
whole of 1995, having fluctuated in a narrow band 
around Mdl 4.5 per US$. 
All quantitative performance criteria under the 
SBA-supported IMP programme were observed for 
all quarters of 1995. A new 3-year programme has 
been prepared by the Moldovan authorities, and a 
request for an EFF to support this programme will be 
considered by the IMP Board in May 1996. Prior 
actions will however have to be taken, notably in the 
area of energy policy (price rise to provide cost 
recovery) and price and trade liberalisation (reduction 
of import tariffs, abolition of excise taxes on exports 
to non-CIS, amendment of the system of reference 
prices for exports). 
Arrears remained a substantial problem in Moldova in 
1995, despite the progress made by the Government 
in reducing its own arrears, and even though some 
progress were made in stabilising the situation. 
Several measures have already been implemented to 
tackle the problem and further measures are envisaged 
in the new programme. 
3. Structural reforms 
Important measures were initiated in 1995. The 
privatisation process slowed in early 1995, owing 
partly to a "wait-and-see" attitude of enterprise 
managers for the new 1995/96 Privatisation 
Programme, finally approved by Parliament in March 
1995. It gathered momentum in the following months, 
however, and according to Government estimates, 
2200 enterprises, representing about 70% of the 
economy were privatised through the voucher 
programme, concluded in November 1995. Cash 
privatisation revenues were however disappointing: 
44 enterprises were privatised for an amount of Mdl 
22 million (about US$ 5 million), to be compared to 
a schedule of 200 enterprises to be privatised for an 
estimated value of Mdl 140 million (about US$ 30 
million). Important to note is the role of fiduciary 
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companies and investment funds which, following 
first estimates, subscribed about 70% of total shares. 
The development of a securities market will however 
be vital to the final success of the privatisation 
process. In this respect, the start in June 1995 of the 
Moldovan Stock Exchange operations was an 
important step. Satisfactory progress has been 
registered since then, especially when compared with 
the experience of other stock exchanges at a similar 
stage of development. Concerning apartments and 
housing, roughly 70% of all apartments were 
privatised, and housing privatisation is scheduled to 
be completed by mid-96. Progress in privatisation of 
agriculture has been slow: a number of state farms and 
collectives have been transformed into joint stock 
companies but land cannot be transferred for cash -
and this will remain the case until 2001 under the 
present law, which represents a legal impediment to 
privatisation of agriculture. 
Important progress was recorded in enterprise 
restructuring: liquidation proceedings were initiated 
against 20 state enterprises, of which 10 were 
completed. However, much remains to be done to 
enforce financial discipline. Progress in bankruptcy 
and collateral laws has been slow: the bankruptcy law, 
still under discussion in Parliament, will need 
substantial revision to reach international standards. 
The maximum import tariff was lowered to 20% in 
December 1995, with a few exceptions, and the 
remaining export quotas - on grain and grain products 
- was lifted. However, the 1996 draft budget, 
presented by the Government in November 1995, 
included provisions on tariffs and export taxation, 
which raised fears of a reversal of the significant trade 
liberalisation advances made over the past two years. 
As already indicated, these trade measures will have 
to be cancelled to allow for the adoption of the new 
EFF-supported IMF programme. 
4. Implementation of macro- financial assistance 
The Community loan of ECU 45 million, decided on 
13 June 1994, was to be disbursed in two tranches, 
upon the fulfilment of conditions specified in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) attached to 
the loan agreement. The first tranche, of ECU 25 
million, was disbursed in December 1994, on the basis 
of the successful completion of the first programme 
review under the IMF stand-by arrangement. The 
disbursement of the second tranche, of ECU 20 
million, was conditional upon a successful track 
record of the IMF stand-by arrangement and subject 
to a positive evaluation by the Commission of 
performance criteria and of progress made with 
respect to structural reform in the areas of price, trade 
and foreign exchange liberalisation, privatisation, and 
financial discipline of enterprises and financial sector. 
In view of the measures taken and the commitments 
provided by the authorities, the conditions attached to 
the disbursement of the second tranche of the 
Community loan were broadly met. The disbursement 
of the second tranche therefore took place in August 
1995. 
In order to ensure a sustainable balance of payments 
situation in the 1995-1996 period, further 
macro-financial assistance in favour of Moldova, to 
complement the resources provided by the IMF and 
the World Bank, was recognised as being necessary by 
the international donor community, in the framework 
of the Consultative Group meeting organised by the 
World Bank in March 1995. In this context, the 
ECOFIN Council indicated on 20 March 1995 that it 
would favourably consider a Commission proposal 
for further Community assistance. Following the 
disbursement of the second tranche of the first 
macro-financial assistance, the Commission formally 
adopted in November 1995 a proposal for further 
macro-financial assistance to Moldova of up to ECU 
15 million. The Council decided on 25 March 199612 
to adopt the Commission proposal. The 
implementation of this new assistance is however 
subordinated to the adoption by the IMF of the new 
three-year programme to be supported by an EFF and 
will also be subject to the fulfilment of conditions still 
to be negotiated with the Moldovan authorities and to 
be included in a new Memorandum of Understanding. 
VIII. ROMANIA 
1. Introduction 
Romania was a relatively latecomer among Central 
and Eastern European countries in the 
implementation of the adjustment and reform process 
required for the establishment of a market economy. 
Despite a number of exogenous shocks ( collapse of 
the traditional Soviet market, tlie need for a fast trade 
re-orientation, the negative impact of the UN 
imposed embargo on Serbia etc.), Romania's 
macroeconomic performance has been encouraging 
in 1995. 
Available data point to a very high real GDP growth 
in 1995. The official unemployment rate was brought 
down and the high inflation rate ( 1993 : 300 % ) 
was drastically reduced. In 1995 the estimated 
budget deficit/GDP ratio was 2.8%. Consumer prices 
have been liberalized, trade has been re-oriented 
12 Council Decision 96/242/EC. 
towards the West and exports are expanding 
vigorously. The role of private enterprises is 
increasing in terms of added value, employment, 
capitalization, investment and exports. 
In 1995 the country regained access to the 
international capital market. At the same time, 
Romania experienced growing difficulties with 
implementing tight monetary and fiscal policies; the 
trade balance and the current account both 
deteriorated, the exchange rate failed to stabilize and 
a significant divergence (up to 20%) re-appeared by 
the end of last year between the interbank exchange 
rate and the (relatively free) exchange bureaux rate, 
reflecting the government's involvement in the forex 
market. This means that Romania is de facto under a 
dual exchange rate regime. The government continues 
to rely heavily upon administrative, regulatory and 
restrictive licensing measures particularly vis-a-vis 
financial intermediaries and commercial banks active 
on the foreign exchange market. 
In 1995 foreign currency reserves declined 
substantially, reflecting the Central Bank's attempt to 
stabilize the leu exchange rate. 
Results attained so far with structural reform appear to 
be mixed, particularly as regards the 
demonopolization of financial services, financial 
restructuring and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, further reductions in subsidies and further 
trade liberalization. Despite some delays and 
"stop-and-go" policies, many decisions have finally 
been adopted during 1995 and the legislative and 
administrative lay-out is now available for 
programme implementation in 1996 and beyond. 
The IMF review in November-December 1995 led to 
the approval by the Fund of an extension of the current 
stand-by arrangement to April 1997 and the increase 
of it to US$ 750 million, to be disbursed in several 
tranches. At the same time, the World Bank finalized 
a FESAL loan in favour of Romania worth US$ 280 
million. The Community decided to disburse the first 
tranche (ECU 55 million) of its macroeconomic loan, 
totalling ECU 125 million in November 1995. 
2. Macroeconomic performance 
The main objective of the government's 
macroeconomic programme for 1995 was to bring 
annual inflation down from 62% as of end of 1994 to 
around 30%, reduce the fiscal deficit, support 
production and exports, liberalize the foreign 
exchange market, stabilize the leu exchange rate, and 
improve the country's external position. To attain 
these ambitious objectives, the government 
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committed itself to continue implementing a rather 
restrictive monetary, fiscal and incomes policy and, at 
the same time, accelerate structural reforms and 
develop market-based regulatory instruments in the 
financial market. 
To strengthen the overall position of the country's 
balance of payments and stabilize the leu, adequate 
external financing was required, under the form of 
IMF and WB financial support, FDI investment and 
borrowing on the international capital market. In this 
respect, efforts were made with a view to increasing 
the Western and IFis' confidence in the Romanian 
policy programme and in the country's economic 
perspectives on the medium-term. 
Moreover, while Romania's economic performance 
continued to be positive in 1995 in several respects, 
only a sluggish progress was recorded in carrying out 
structural reforms. The overall situation became more 
problematic by the end of the year with the 
re-appearance of a major spread between the official 
and the market-determined exchange rates; foreign 
currency reserves further contracted, the country's 
external position weakened considerably and the 
confidence on leu declined sharply. 
GDP real growth in 1995 reached 6.9% (against 1.3% 
and 3.9% in 1993 and 1994 respectively). Industrial 
production increased by 8.9%, agriculture by 4.9% 
and construction by 11.9%. Hourly labour 
productivity increased by 15% in 1995, compared to 
the same period of the preceding year. The 
unemployment rate contracted from 11 % at the 
beginning of 1995 to 9.3% at the end of December. 
This was caused in large part by a reallocation of 
employment towards the agricultural sector, which 
appears to have absorbed a substantial portion of the 
labour force released from industry. This trend could 
hardly be seen as sustainable, given the low level of 
productivity of the agricultural sector, which already 
employs above 30% of the total labour force. Inflation 
has been reduced substantially from an annual rate of 
62% in 1994 to 33.3% in 1995. However, consumer 
prices increases sharply accelerated during the last 
quarter of the year, partly in the light of seasonal 
factors and partly reflecting the fact that 
non-inflationary economic growth cannot be 
sustained without major structural adjustment. 
In 1995, the budget deficit ratio was contained to 2.8% 
of GDP, reflecting administrative decisions aimed at 
cutting direct current public expenditure, limiting 
public financial transfers to loss-making enterprises 
and ra1smg fiscal revenue, following the 
implementation of a tax reform in 1994. A 
considerable quasi-fiscal deficit still exists under the 
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form of preferential lending by the Central Bank and 
state owned banks to loss making SOEs. Some 
autonomous extra-budgetary funds have also been 
established. 
In 1995, Romania's external position deteriorated. 
The trade deficit was around US$ 1.3 bn, more than 
twice the deficit recorded in 1994 (US$ 582 million). 
The deficit rose in spite of a rather promising 
expansion of exports, which increased by about 22% 
compared to 1994. Moreover, the increase in imports 
was much higher, slightly above 32%, reflecting a 
surge in the demand for Western manufactured and 
capital goods as well as energy, mainly by 
loss-making public enterprises. In line with the 
weakening current account position (which recorded 
a deficit of 4.4% of GDP) in 1995, foreign exchange 
reserves declined, to reach US$ 2. 7 bn by the year-end 
equivalent to less than two months of imports, down 
from a level corresponding to about four months of 
imports at the beginning of the year. 
FDI through joint ventures started to pick up in the 
third quarter of 1995. However, foreign investment 
performance in 1995 was disappointing with new 
flows in the region of US$ 400 million against 500 
million witnessed in 1994. In 1995, Romania also 
managed to regain access to the international financial 
market through a series of syndicated loans which 
were over-subscribed. 
Romania's external debt remains relatively low. At the 
end of 1995 the medium and long term external debt 
increased moderately to US$ 5.3 billion, from US$ 4.5 
billion at the end of the previous year. 
Monetary and fiscal policy has followed a rather 
uneven path in 1995. Restrictive policies, responsible 
for most of the positive results particularly as regards 
the decline of inflation rate and the leu's relative 
stability during the first half of the year, were 
somewhat loosened in the course of 1995. However, 
in view of negotiations on the extension of the IMF 
stand-by arrangement, the authorities again tightened 
monetary policy during the last two months of 1995 
mainly through a sharp increase in the refinancing rate 
and introduced a restrained draft budget for 1996. The 
National Bank of Romania (NBR) still provides 
preferential credit ("directed credit") in favour of the 
agricultural sector, export and energy at an interest 
rate of 35%. 
The implementation of credit control measures by the 
monetary authorities reduced commercial banks' 
access to the Central Bank refinancing, thus 
weakening their financial position. The subsequent 
credit squeeze led to a considerable expansion of 
payment arrears at enterprise level. 
The continuing administrative intervention on the 
foreign exchange market throughout 1995 and the 
temporary measures taken by the monetary 
authorities in March 1996, limiting the number of 
banks licensed to operate on the forex market, have 
been causes of serious concern. At present, a dual 
exchange rate fixing mechanism is" de facto" in place, 
and the volume of daily foreign exchange transactions 
on the inter-bank market contracted sharply during 
the first quarter of 1996. 
3. Structural reforms 
Eliminating arrears and imposing financial discipline 
on loss-making state-owned enterprises constituted 
key objectives in Romania's economic stabilization 
and restructuring programme for 1995. A number of 
large state-owned companies and "Regies 
autonomes" have been targeted for strict financial 
surveillance. These measures include isolation from 
the banking system, negotiation of conciliation 
agreements with their creditors as well as elaboration 
and implementation of Financial Recovery Plans. 
Also it was envisaged to accelerate the standard and 
mass privatization programmes. Results attained so 
far are preliminary and difficult to assess because of 
a number of delays in programme implementation, 
growing financial problems, and administrative 
inefficiency. The overall picture, however, is rather 
disappointing. Parliament approved the long-overdue 
Commercial Insolvency Law in March 1995. The law 
permits out-of-court conciliation procedures and, if 
required, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, 
while allowing sufficient flexibility for rescue 
operations. 
The large state enterprises which still dominate the 
economy continue to benefit from partially hidden 
quasi-subsidies such as below-market interest rates 
and directed credits. If properly accounted for, these 
would increase the public deficit, thus clearly making 
the fiscal policy stance less restrictive. Furthermore, 
state companies unable to service their debts are rarely 
forced into liquidation, which adds to the inefficiency 
of the financial sector. 
The number of privatized enterprises has increased, 
but by the end of the year only one third of small 
enterprises, and merely 6% of large ones, had been 
privatized. The response of the public to the mass 
privatization programme launched in mid-1995 has 
been worse than expected, thus obliging the 
authorities to postpone the deadline for registration. 
Citizens may now invest their vouchers directly into 
companies until the end of March 1996, or in the 
Private Ownership Fund until the end of April. 
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The procedure for privatising two of the five major 
state-owned banks was due to start in 1995 but was 
postponed until 1996 and only one bank has so far 
been nominated, the Romanian Development Bank. 
4. Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Following Romania's agreement in principle with the 
IMF on a new programme for 1994-95, the authorities 
requested the EU and the G24 to grant further 
macro-financial assistance to Romania to cover the 
residual external financing gap of US$ 275 million 
under the 1994-95 programme. Commitments by the 
EU/G-24 reached some US$ 219 million or nearly 
80% of the residual gap. This includes further EU 
macro-financial assistance for an amount up to ECU 
125 million, in two tranches, decided by the Council 
on 20 June 199413_ In December 1994, the 
Commission agreed with the Romanian authorities 
the macro-economic conditions attached to the 
disbursement of the loan. However, the disbursement 
of the first tranche (ECU 55 million) was delayedm 
due to policy slippages that occured during the 
implementation of the programme in the first quarter 
of 1995. 
In early July the Romanian authorities reached an 
understanding with the IMF that paved the way for 
completion of the first review of the programme, 
which eventually took place in November/December 
1995. The disbursement of the first tranche of the EU 
loan took place in November 1995. 
The disbursement of the second tranche (70 MECU) 
is linked to the effective implementation of specific 
structural reform measures, including progress in 
privatization, financial restructuring of loss-making 
enterprises and banking sector reforms, agreed upon 
with the Romanian authorities in the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
IX. THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
1. Introduction 
The dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic (CSFR) on 1 January 1993 had several 
negative implications for the Slovak economy at a 
time when it was still suffering from the shock 
associated with the dismantling of the Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance and from the difficulties 
accompanying the transition to a market economy. 
The dissolution of the federation implied the loss of 
substantial fiscal transfers from the Czech-lands, 
disrupted trade with the Czech Republic, restricted 
Slovakia's access to the international capital markets, 
and was accompanied by speculation against the 
Slovak crown that practically depleted its official 
foreign exchange reserves. 
In this context, the Slovak government agreed with the 
IMF in mid-1993 on a macroeconomic stabilization 
programme for the rest of that year, which was 
supported by the approval in July 1993 of a first 
purchase in the amount of SDR 64.4 million under the 
IMF's Systemic Transformation Facility (STF). In 
addition, the World Bank granted Slovakia a US$ 80 
million Economic Recovery Loan (ERL) in 
November 1993. 
In July 1994, the IMF approved a 20-month stand-by 
credit and a second purchase under the STF totalling 
SDR 180 million, in support of a more comprehensive 
economic programme for 1994-95. In parallel, the 
World Bank began discussions on a possible 
Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment Loan 
(EFSAL). In support of this programme, the EU 
Council adopted on 22 December 199414 a decision 
making available macro-financial assistance to 
Slovakia amounting up to ECU 130 million, as part 
of a G-24 initiative to respond to the request by the 
Slovak authorities for complementary assistance. 
Other members of the G-24 made further 
commitments amounting to US$ 87.3 million. 
2. Macroeconomic performance 
The improvement in macroeconomic performance 
that started in 1994 continued and intensified in 1995. 
The recovery of economic activity accelerated, with 
real GDP growing by an impressive 7.4% and 
industrial production by an estimated 8.4%. Domestic 
demand replaced net exports as the driving force 
behind economic expansion. The strengthening of 
domestic demand, however, largely reflected the 
behaviour of private consumption and stock building. 
Fixed investment, which had been declining sharply 
ever since the transition process began, recorded 
practically no growth in 1995. The economic upswing 
has also been reflected in a decline in the 
unemployment rate from 15.2% in January 1995 to 
13.7% in February 1996. 
Despite this strong growth performance, inflation has 
continued to show a downward trend. Inflation, as 
measured by the year-on-year consumer price index 
( CPI) declined from 11. 7 % in December 1994 to only 
6.1 % in March 1996, the lowest inflation rate 
recorded by any transition country. Real wage growth 
remained high in 1995 (real wages in the industrial 
sector increased by about 6%) but is, to a significant 
13 Counci l Decision 94/369/EC. 
1> Counc il Decision 94/939/EC. 
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extent, being offset by strong productivity gains. 
The reduction in inflation has continued to be 
supported by restrictive macroeconomic policies. 
Reflecting larger than anticipated revenues from VAT 
and income tax, the state budget finished 1995 with 
a deficit of Sk 8.3 billion, well below the Sk 21 billion 
deficit that had been programmed. At the same time, 
the general government surplus was estimated at 
about 0.5% of GDP, which compares to a deficit of 
1.4% of GDP in 1994 and of 7.6% of GDP in 1993. 
Monetary policy has also remained relatively tight, 
although its stance has been somewhat eased 
compared to 1994. The net domestic assets of the 
banking system expanded by 5% in 1995, 
approximately as programmed. The money supply 
(M2), however, grew faster than programmed, 
reflecting the rapid expansion of net foreign assets, in 
turn a consequence of the stronger than expected 
balance of payments situation. M2 is estimated to 
have increased by 20.8%, compared to a programme 
target of 10%. Consistent with its policy of 
increasingly relying on indirect instruments of 
monetary control, the National Bank of Slovakia 
(NBS) abolished all remaining credit ceilings on 
banks in January 1996. 
After the remarkable improvement experienced in 
1994, Slovakia's balance of payments continued to 
strengthen en 1995. The current account, wich had 
swung from a deficit of 5.4% of GDP in 1993 to a 
surplus of 5.7% of GDP in 1994, recorded a new 
surplus of 4.3% of GDP in 1995. The evolution of the 
trade balance in the first months of 1996, however, 
suggests that the surplus will continue to shrink in 
1996 reflecting the strength of domestic demand. 
The capital account also improved in 1995, with total 
net capital inflows reaching almost US$ 1 billion, 
compared to US$ 130 million in 1994. The main 
factor behind this rise in net capital inflows has been 
the substantial increase in foreign borrowing by 
Slovak enterprises and banks. Also, the tight 
management of interbank liquidity by the NBS, in 
combination with the perceived stability of the Slovak 
crown (and, during the first half of 1995, the 
expectation of a revaluation against the Czech crown), 
has led to some short-term capital inflows. Foreign 
direct investment inflows, however, have remained 
low, partly reflecting uncertainty over the 
government's market-oriented reforms and, in 
particular, over privatization (see below). 
Slovakia's access to the international capital markets 
has been facilitated by successive upgradings of 
Slovakia's credit ratings. In May 1995, Moody's 
assigned to Slovakia an investment grade rating 
(Baa3). Standard & Poor's, for its part, upgraded 
Slovakia's rating in April 1995 (from BB-to BB+) and 
again in April 1996 (to BBB-, an investment grade 
mark). Slovakia has thus become one of the few 
transition countries that can boast investment grade 
ratings from the leading US rating agencies. 
These favourable trends in both the current and capital 
accounts have been translated into a substantial 
increase in international reserves. Official reserves 
(including gold) rose from US$ 1.75 billion at the end 
of 1994 to US$ 3.4 billion at the end of 1995. This 
represents a comfortable level of about 4 months of 
imports. During the same period, the reserves of 
whole banking system have increased from US$ 3.1 
billion to US$ 5 billion. 
Following a 10% devaluation of the Slovak crown in 
July 1993, the exchange rate of the crown has been 
kept stable against a basket of Western currencies. In 
July 1994, the number of currencies in the basket was 
reduced from five to two (the Deutsche mark and the 
US dollar). In view of the termination of the bilateral 
clearing system with the Czech Republic in October 
1995, the Slovak crown was revalued by 5% against 
the Czech currency. In January 1996, the fluctuation 
band around the central rate was increased from 
± 1.5% to ± 3%. 
Slovakia inherited from the Czechoslovak federation 
a relatively low external debt. Although debt and debt 
service ratios have deteriorated since the country 
reached independence, they remain at reasonable 
levels. The foreign debt-over-GDP ratio has 
increased from 25.7% in early 1993 to 33.8% in 
October 1995. The debt service-over-exports ratio, 
for its part, has risen from 3.3% in 1992 to an 
estimated 9.5% in 1995. 
3. Structural reforms 
In spring 1994, the Slovak authorities adopted a plan 
to accelerate privatization based on a greater reliance 
on voucher privatization. By November 1994, about 
3.5 million citizens had registered to buy vouchers. 
The new Slovak government formed in December 
1994, however, decided in June 1995 to cancel the 
voucher privatization scheme. Instead of shares in 
state enterprises, the Slovak citizens that bought 
vouchers have been given 5-year interest bearing 
bonds issued by the National Property Fund (NPF). 
NPF bonds totalling Sk 33.3 billion ( or the equivalent 
of about 8% of GDP) were issued in January 1996. 
This new scheme not only implies a new delay in the 
privatization process but could have negative fiscal 
implications, particularly given the fact that the total 
market value of the shares that were earmarked for 
voucher privatization is likely to be significantly 
below the total face value of the bonds issued by the 
NPF. 
The decision to cancel the voucher scheme is part of 
a more general shift in privatization policy announced 
by the current government. The new privatization 
policy emphasizes standard methods of privatization. 
Direct sales (largely sales to managers and 
employees) have gathered momentum since 
mid-1995, but (they) are being criticized for their lack 
of transparency. Another important element of the 
new privatization policy is the government's decision, 
incorporated in Law No. 175 passed in July 1995, to 
keep permanent state ownership in 29 so-called 
"important enterprises" (including the big utilities in 
the energy sector, telecommunications and armament 
enterprises). Since the bulk of the "important 
enterprises" had initially been included in the 1994 
voucher privatization scheme, this measure has 
effectively reduced by about 35% the total book value 
of the enterprises slated for privatization under the 
second wave of large-scale privatization. Law No. 
175 also allows the state veto power over key 
decisions in 45 so-called "strategic enterprises" 
(including the largest industrial enterprises) and shifts 
the exercise of the state ownership rights over 
"strategic enterprises" back from the NPF to the 
founding ministries. These decisions regarding 
"strategic enterprises" could slow both the 
privatization and the restructuring of these 
enterprises. However, the part of Law No. 175 
allowing the state to maintain ( or regain) "golden 
shares" in "strategic enterprises" has been declared 
unconstitutional by the Slovak constitutional court. 
Regarding the Slovak financial system, substantial 
progress still needs to be made with respect to the 
problem of non-performing loans, privatization and 
the promotion of competition. Stricter regulations on 
the classification and provisioning of bad loans came 
into force in July 1995. Government concern about the 
negative fiscal repercussions, however, has so far 
prevented the passing of tax law amendments 
temporarily granting to banks full tax deductibility for 
bad-loan provisions, a measure that the authorities 
had originally envisaged to take place by end-1994. 
In January 1996, the government announced its 
intention to sell in 1996 its majority holdings in the 
country's largest savings bank (Slovenska 
Sporitelna), the two largest commercial banks (VUB 
and IRB) and the largest insurance company 
(Slovenska Poistovna). In February 1996, the 
Parliament passed a new banking law strengthening 
the supervisory powers of the NBS. 
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Following abuses and irregularities by certain 
privatization investment funds (PIFs) and investment 
companies, the Ministry of Finance, in the first half of 
1995, restricted the operations of several of them. In 
addition, new legislation was adopted in July 1995 
aimed at increasing the transparency and control of 
their activities, and at better protecting the 
shareholders of the PIFs. Unfortunately, however, the 
new regulations, in conjunction with the cancellation 
of the voucher privatization scheme, will also limit the 
role of PIFs in corporate governance. In particular, 
with effect from the end of 1996, the limit on the 
maximum equity stake a PIF may hold in a given 
company will be reduced from 20% to 10% of the 
company's capital. 
Under pressure from the EU and WTO, the Slovak 
authorities reduced the 10% import surcharge on 
consumer goods which was introduced in March 
1994, to 7.5% from mid- July 1996. Following 
deliberations in the WTO Balance of Payments 
Committee, the Slovak authorities have announced 
that they would abolish the surcharge by the end of 
1996. 
On 1 October 1995, a new foreign exchange act came 
into effect. The Slovak crown was made fully 
convertible for current account purposes, and the 
bilateral clearing system maintained with the Czech 
Republic since early 1993 was terminated. The 
authorities also intend gradually to relax certain 
restrictions on capital movements. 
Most prices in Slovakia have been liberalized. The 
share of items that still have regulated prices 
represents only about 5% of total turnover. These 
items include energy (electricity, gas, heating and 
petrol), water, pharmaceutical products, rents, 
telephones and public transportation. Electricity, gas 
and heating tariffs paid by households remain 
significantly below their economic cost-recovery 
levels. The upward adjustment of these tariffs 
envisaged under the World Bank ERL's and the IMF's 
stand-by programmes has not been implemented. 
4. Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Slovakia met all the macroeconomic targets and 
performance criteria agreed with the IMF in the 
context of the 1994-95 stand-by programme. 
However, the failure to implement the structural 
reform conditions prevented a successful completion 
of the mid-term review of the programme, which had 
initially been scheduled for March 1995. The main 
factor preventing the approval of the mid-term review 
were the delays and the subsequent policy shifts in the 
area of privatization, including the unexpected 
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cancellation of the shares-for-vouchers scheme and 
its replacement by the scheme based on the issuance 
of NPF bonds. The authorities also failed to comply 
with the conditions regarding the granting of 
temporary full tax deductibility for bad loan 
provisions made by banks, the adjustment of energy 
prices and the elimination of the import surcharge. 
The slow formulation and instability of privatization 
and other structural policies also led the World Bank 
to discontinue discussions on an EFSAL operation in 
April 1995. 
In May 1995, the Commission services held 
discussions with the Slovak authorities on the 
economic policy measures to be attached to the 
implementation of the EU loan facility. During the 
discussions, however, insufficient progress was made, 
with the Slovak authorities showing little flexibility 
with respect to the measures emphasized by the 
Commission, in particular the early phasing out of the 
10% import surcharge, the adjustment of energy 
prices and the need to prevent the new regulations on 
IPFs from weakening their role in corporate 
governance. The resumption of the discussions was 
complicated by the government's decisions on 
privatization announced in June 1995, including in 
particular the cancellation of the shares-for-vouchers 
privatization scheme, which was considered by the 
Commission to be an essential condition for the 
effective disbursement of the assistance. 
Meanwhile, and as noted above, Slovakia's 
macroeconomic and, in particular, balance of 
payments situation experienced a remarkable 
turnaround. In view of the strengthening of the 
external position, the Slovak government announced 
that they did not wish to draw on the remaining 
tranches of the IMF stand-by credit. In the event, 
Slovakia only made the first two purchases (totalling 
SDR 32.2 million) under this stand-by arrangement, 
which expired in March 1996. 
In this context, on 23 January 1996, the Commission 
approved a proposal for a Council decision repealing 
the 1994 decision granting further macro-financial 
assistance to Slovakia. This decision is expected to be 
adopted by the Council in 1996. 
Regarding the implementation of the complementary 
macro-financial assistance committed by other G-24 
members, Japan released its US$ 60 million assistance 
in early May 1995, in the form of an Exim Bank 
co-financing of the World Bank's ERL. No 
disbursements by other donors had taken place at the 
time of writing of this report. 
X. UKRAINE 
1. Introduction 
The on-going struggle between reformers and 
conservative forces continues to characterize 
economic policy and slows down progress in 
economic reform in Ukraine. In the second half of 
1995 several slippages in policy implementation led 
to a weakening of the exchange rate and to the budget 
and inflation targets being missed. Therefore, the IMF 
suspended the execution of its Stand-By 
Arrangement (SBA) in December (and eventually let 
it expire in early 1996). Nevertheless, progress in 
stabilisation has been considerable in 1995: the speed 
of decline in the economy was halved from -23 % in 
1994 to -11,8 %, inflation and the general government 
deficit were brought down, and the trade balance 
improved. Structural reforms were started in the end 
of 1994 and have achieved some results, mainly in 
price and trade liberalisation and more recently in 
small-scale privatization. However, progress on 
large-scale privatization and restructuring has been 
slow and foreign direct investment is still negligible. 
As a consequence of erratic policy implementation 
and slow structural reform as well as severe weather 
conditions, it is expected that economic growth will 
only recover in 1997. 
2. Macroeconomic performance 
It took three years after the independence of the 
country before economic reforms were finally started 
in Ukraine in October 1994. After his election, 
President Kuchma introduced a programme of price, 
trade and exchange liberalisation, combined with 
reductions in subsidies and state intervention. A 
tighter fiscal policy was adopted, buttressed by a 
restrictive monetary policy. The programme was able 
to slow down the rapid economic deterioration. By 
mid-1995, monthly inflation was reduced to around 
5%, the exchange rate of the karbovanets (Ukraine's 
temporary currency) stabilised, international reserves 
accumulated and a stabilisation of output seemed 
possible in the short-term. 
However, President Kuchma and Prime Minister 
Marchuk continued to be confronted with a 
conservative majority in Parliament that managed to 
delay or even cancel some reform measures. 
Furthermore, during the summer of 1995, doubts 
arose over the commitment of the government to 
continue the transformation process. The government 
encouraged the commercial banks to increase their 
credits to insolvent enterprises, enterprise subsidies 
were increased and the budget continued to pay for 
accumulated gas debts of the enterprise sector. 
Monetary financing of the deficit was also higher than 
f 
expected. Consequently, the karbovanets weakened 
again and the end-of-year budget and inflation targets 
were missed. Because structural reform was also 
lagging, the IMF decided in December 1995 to 
postpone a decision on the disbursement of the fourth 
tranche of the SBA. 
Although Ukraine was not able to observe the 
objectives of its stabilisation programme in winter 
1995/96, progress in stabilisation has been 
considerable in 1995. The speed of decline in the 
economy was halved from-23% in 1994 to-11,8% in 
1995 with even some month-on-month 
improvements before August. It is now expected that 
GDP will continue to fall in 1996 before stabilising in 
1997 at an output level of around 40% of the 
pre-transition level. However, because of the growing 
importance of the informal sector, official figures 
might underestimate the actual progress in economic 
activity. Yearly inflation was brought down from 
401 % in December 1994 to 182% one year later. 
Further improvement is expected for 1996. Although 
different data sources differ widely on sign and level 
of the trade balance, they all show an improvement in 
1995, as a consequence of growing exports, mainly to 
non-FSU countries and stagnating imports. 
Registered unemployment in Ukraine remains 
extremely low at about one half percent of the labour 
force. Actual unemployment, however, may be 
considerably higher since hidden unemployment in 
large state firms and administration remains high and 
many enterprises in difficulty maintain their 
personnel but send them on unpaid leave. Wages 
generally increased quite rapidly in 1995. Real wages 
increased by 12% and the average wage increase in the 
government sector in the first half of 1995 was about 
50% in real terms, bringing wages to the same levels 
as in the enterprise sector, thereby adding pressure on 
the budget and on inflation. 
The government budget for 1995 aimed at reducing 
the cash deficit from 8.6% of GDP in 1994 to 3%. The 
actual outcome is more likely to have been around 4%, 
mainly due to an overrun in public expenditure. The 
overrun is even more important when it is taken into 
account that the government again accumulated some 
payment arrears on energy imports which are not 
visible in the deficit figure on a cash basis. 
3. Structural reforms 
Before 1994, Ukraine made little or no progress with 
structural reform. After his election, President 
Kuchma issued a decree, in November 1994, to 
1mtiate a voucher-based mass privatization 
programme and set a target of 8,000 ( out of 18,000) 
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medium and large enterprises to be privatised in 1995. 
However, due to organisational problems, opposition 
from the Parliament and local bureaucracies, too high 
reservation prices, the exclusion of foreign investors 
as well as a lack of confidence on the part of the 
general public, only 2,700 enterprises were actually 
put up for sale and the majority of shares in only 1,500 
of these enterprises have effectively been sold. This 
lack of progress is particularly preoccupying in the 
important agricultural sector. Continued 
disagreement between the President and Parliament 
on the way to proceed has prevented any significant 
progress. Until recently, progress with regard to 
small-scale privatization has also remained limited. 
The beneficial effects of new measures that were 
introduced in late 1994 only appeared in the third 
quarter of 1995. Consequently, an important number 
of small businesses was still to be privatised in 1996, 
although it was originally intended to end this 
operation by the end of 1995. 
Given the limited progress on privatization and the 
absence of foreign direct investment, enterprise 
restructuring continues to be weak. The old 
monopolistic structure of the economy is still widely 
present, mainly in heavy industries and in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical sectors. Because 
directed bank credits and important subsidy flows 
persist, the budget constraint for most enterprises 
remains soft. Furthermore, inter-enterprise arrears 
are accumulating rapidly and although a bankruptcy 
legislation exists, its implementation is ineffective. 
4. Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The EU loan of ECU 85 million decided on 22 
December 1994 (94/940/EC) was to be disbursed in a 
single tranche conditional upon an IMF stand-by 
arrangement, a rapid implementation of the EU/G-7 
Nuclear Safety Action Plan for Ukraine and progress 
with structural reform. After significant delays on the 
part of Ukraine, it was finally disbursed in December 
1995. 
In view of Ukraine's urgent financial needs and 
against the background of further efforts being made 
by the Ukrainian authorities to pursue with economic 
reform, the Council decided on 23 October 1995 15 to 
provide Ukraine with further Community 
macro-financial assistance in the form of a second 
loan of up to ECU 200 million that would complement 
financial assistance from the international financial 
institutions and other bilateral donors. 
September 1996 
15 Council Decision 95/442/EC. 
-40-
Principal economic policy measures - August/September 1996 
Community (EU R-15) 
None. 
Belgium (B) 
23.8 The centra l bank reduces its central rate from 3.20% to 3% and the rate on advances 
within the cei ling from 4.45% 10 4.25 %. 
Denmark (DK) 
23.8 The central bank lowers the repo rate by 20 basis points 10 3.50%. 
27.8 The government publishes its 1997 draft state budget proposal. The draft foresees 
a state deficit (DAU-<lefici t) of DKR 22.6 billion in 1997. down from DKR 31.2 billion 
this year. The proposal would entai l general government net borrowing of about 0.5 % 
ofGDPin 1997. 
Germany (D) 
/.8 The law or, pre-pension pan- time work comes into force. Workers 55 years of age 
and older can agree with their employer to work pan- time for the next live years. The 
worker wou ld then receive. under cenain conditions. a contribution from the Federal 
Labour Office rais ing his pay 10 at least 70% of previous pay. 
22.8 The Bundesbank lowers the interest rate for the next two repo lenders from 3.30% 
to 3.00%. 
13.9 The Bundestag approves a large part of the Programme for more growth and em-
ployment'· . Measures include a reduction in sick pay to 80% of wages (applicable only 
where the issue is not specifi cally regulated in wage agreements), the lifting of the ex-
emption from employ ment protection Jaws from 5 lo I O employees and the gradual in-
c rease in the pensionable age for women from 60 lo 65. Several other measures restrict 
pension ri ghts, notably stricter rules on recogniti on of time spent in education or unem-
ployment and tighter condi tions for earl y ret irement. In the public health fi eld, savings 
ofDM 7.5 bi ll ion are 10 be obtained through a series of measures. including higher con-
tributions for medicines. 
Greece (EL) 
29.8 The Bank of Greece cuts its bid intervention rate in overnight funds by 40 basis 
points to 12.-10% in two steps. 
Spain (E) 
27.9 The Government approves the draft 1997 State budget law. The general govern-
ment deficit is to fall to 2.5%ofGDP. Nominal expenditure is to grow by 1.7% (a decline 
in real terms) and nominal revenues are to rise by 5.9%. The draft law is sent lo parlia-
men t and should be adopted by the end of the year. 
France (F) 
1.8 The Bank of France lowers its fi ve-10-ten-<lay lending rate by 15 basis points to 
4.75%. but leaves its key intervention rate steady al 3.55%. 
/0.8 In order 10 reduce the cost of employ ment sc hemes the government decides to ab-
olish the "aide au premier emploi des jeunes" (an incentive for employers to provide 
young people entering the labour market wi th a first job) and to reform the "contra! in-
itiati ve-emploi" (CIE) by reducing the subsidy paid 10 employers who take on the long-
term unemployed. Both measures will come into effect on I September. 
22.8 The Bank of France cuts its irnervention rate 10 3.35% from 3.55%. 
5.9 The Prime Mini ster announces a FF 75 billion tax cut over the next fi ve years. In 
1997 income tax should decrease by FF 25 billion and state medical insurance pay-
ments should be reduced by 1.3 percentage points from 6.8% of gross income to 5.5%. 
Social security contributions will increase by FF 7 billion but will be levied for the first 
time on in vestment income as well as on wages. 
/8.9 The Government adopts the draft 1997 budget. Taking a 2.3% GDP growth as-
sumption for 1997. it targets a FF 283.7 billion central government deficit (3.45% of 
GDP) as compared with a FF287.8 billion deficit thi s year (3.65% of GDP). Thanks lo a 
spec ial FF 37.5 billion payment by France Telecom to the State to cover future pensions 
li abi lity for its employees and the continued consolidat ion of social security accounts, 
the general government defic it is planned to amou nt to 3% of GDP in 1997. Tax rece ipts 
wi ll increase by only 0.6% compared with the 1996 budget as a result of a FF25 billion 
net income lax cut. Public spending will be reduced by 1.5% in real terms. 
/9.9 The Bank of France cuts its money-market intervention rate by 10 basis points to 
3.25% and leaves its five- to ten-<lay lending rate unchanged. 
26.9 The Government decides 110110 extend the incenti ve scheme lo replace old cars, 
which is sc hedu led lo end on Seplembh 30. Since October 1995, 600 OOO new car buy-
ers have been offered a bonus of between FF 5 OOO and FF 7 OOO if they trade in a ve-
hicle that is al least e ight years old. 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
28.9 The Government announces its budget plans fo r 1997. It indicates a target for the 
1997 ge neral government borrowing requirement of 3% of GDP. The planned discre-
tionary measures amount to LIT 62.5 trillion or 3.2% of GDP. They consist of expendi -
ture cuts equi valent to 1.3% of GDP. a one--0ff increase in income tax (0.7% of GDP), 
other revenue-side measures (0.6% of GDP) and as yet unspecified Treasury operations 
(0.6% of GDP). 
Luxembourg (L) 
17. 9 The Government presents the draft budget for 1997, which envisages revenue of 
LFR 163.9 billion (up 5.2% on 1996) and expenditure of LFR 163.3 billion (up 4.3%). 
The budget shows a surplu s ofLFR 600 million, or 0.1 % of GDP. The Finance Minister 
announces that the inflation rate for 1997 is put at between 1.5% and 2.4%. Over40% of 
the total budget will be earmarked for famil y and soc ial policy. The Government plans 
10 reduce corporation tax in three stages in the period 1997-99 from 33% to 30%. the 
aim being 10 safeguard existingjobs and 10 create new ones. It also intends to abolish the 
tax on working capital. Public in vestment. which is put at LFR 15.8 billion, accounts 
for 9.1 % of public expe nditure. The Government has set aside an amou nt of 
LFR I . I billion for the restructuring of Arbed. 
Netherlands (NL) 
22.8 The Nederlandsche Bank reduces its rate on special advances from 2. 70% to 
2.50%. 
17. 9 The Government presents to the two houses of parli ament its draft budget fo r 1997, 
which is based on forecasts compiled by the Central Planning Bureau (CPB). The fore-
cast for GDP growth is 2.5% in 1996 and 2.75 % in 1997. while the rate of infl ation is 
projected 10 be only 2.25 % and 2.5 %. Economic growth is expected to c reate 
103 OOO jobs (90 OOO on a full-time equi valent basis) in 1997 and unemployment is 
predicted 10 fall from 500 OOO 10 465 OOO. Central government expenditure is estimated 
al HFL 202.1 billion and revenue at HFL 182.3 billion. The general government bor-
rowing requirement is put al 2.6% of GDP in 1996 and 2.2% in 1997 thanks lo sustained 
budgetary discipline. The Government envisages a debt/GDP ratio of 76.2%, down by 
2.5 percentage points on 1996. The 1997 budget envisages a decline in the tax rat io. for 
both households and firms, although this will be offset by higher taxes on tobacco, fuel 
and energy consumption, by measures 10 preserve the purchasing power of the bulk of 
the population and by the indexation of allowances (max imum of 2.5%). 
Austria (A) 
22.8 The central bank reduces the tender rate from 3.2% to 3.0% and the GOMEX rate 
from 3.5% to 3.4%. Both rate cuts wi ll be effective from 2 September. 
Portugal (P) 
23.8 The Bank of Ponugal lowers its repo rate by 25 basis points to 7.25%. 
Finland (FIN) 
7.80n a proposal from the Bank of Finland, the Parliamentary Supervisory Board deci-
des on a 50 basis point cut in the base rate, to 4.00%. The cul is effective from 16 Sep-
tember. 
23.8 The Bank of Finland cuts the tender rate by 25 basis points to 3.25%. 
3. 9 The Government submits to Parliament the draft budget. which is based on proj-
ected GDP growth of 3.9% and unemployment of 15.4% in 1997. Central government 
revenue is pl anned to amount to FMK 162.0 billion, whi le ex penditu re is put at 
FMK 190.8 billion in 1997. 
3.9 The Government adopts its convergence programme update. The economic policy 
strategy does not differ from the convergence programme of September 1995. but the 
economic projections for 1996-2000 have been updated to take account of the unex-
pectedly slow economic growth. According to the program me update, the government 
deficit will be reduced to 1.4% of GDP in 1997, and government debt will dec line to 
6 1.0% ofGDP. 
18.9 The Bank of Finland cuts its tender rate by 15 basis points 10 3. 10%. In additi on, 
the interest rate on banks' excess reserves held at the central bank is cut, also by 15 basis 
points, to I . I 0%. 
27.9 The Government presents lo Parli ament a proposal fo r the second suppl ementary 
budget for 1996. The automatic stabili zers. together with FMK 1.2 billion of new 
spending on employment-enhancing measures, lead to an increase in net central gov-
ernment borrowing of FMK 3.6 billion. or0.6% of GDP (this was an ticipated in the con-
vergence programme update of 3 September 1996, which targeted a general govern-
ment deficit of 2.9% of GDP in 1996). 
Sweden (S) 
13.8 The central bank cuts the repo rate by a funher 15 basis points to 5.40%. 
27.8 The central bank cuts the repo rate by a further 15 basis points 10 5.25%. * 
/0.9 The Central Bank cuts the repo rate by 10 basis points to 5.15%. 
20.9 The Government presents the 1997 budget bill. Expenditure cuts and lax increases 
of SKR 12 billion were specified in the consolidation programme. No new measures are 
announced. The general government defi cit is expected 10 fall from 8. 1 % of GDP in 
1995 to 4% in 1996 and 2.6% in 1997. However, the marked improvement in 1996 is 
expl ained panl y by substantial one--0ff savings of around SKR 27 billion, or 1.6% of 
GDP. 
24.9 The Central Bank cuts the repo rate by 10 basis points 10 5.05%. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
None. 
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